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This thesis includes two essays on corporate default risk. 
The first essay directly tests the association between state ownership and firm 
default risk, using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1990 to 2011. I find 
strong evidence that higher state ownership leads to lower default risk due to 
soft budget constraints. State ownership has a stronger effect when firms are 
facing global negative industry return. Moreover, the effect of state ownership 
will be more significant for firms operating in competitive industries. Also, I 
find that state ownership has a less significant effect for firms located in 
regions with less government intervention and a better legal environment, 
where the budget constraint is harder.  
In the second essay, I find strong evidence for the prediction power of 
currency return on firm default risk. And large local currency deprecation is a 
major reason for the positive association between currency return and default 
risk. Using country-level international trade data (the sum of exports and 
imports) as proxy for the likelihood of using foreign currency debt, I find that 
currency return has a greater effect for countries that more rely on 
international trade, providing supporting evidence for the channel of foreign 
currency debt that connects the exchange rate and firm default risk. Moreover, 
I find that while large currency depreciation could lead to higher default risk, 
small depreciation is good for countries with trade surplus (exports are larger 
than imports) and small appreciation is good for countries with trade deficit. In 
addition, the effect of currency return is less significant for countries with 
restrictions on exchange rate and less significant for countries with better 
financial market development.  
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Chapter 1: State Ownership and Firm Default Risk: 
Evidence from China 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Reporting on the Yunwei Co., Ltd., a manufacturing company in China, the 
Financial Times, Asia Edition, August 28, 2013, noted that: 
“It (Yunwei) lost Rmb 1.2bn ($196m) last year, at times using just two-thirds 
of its production capacity….As things deteriorate, Yunwei at least has a 
cushion to fall back on. Its parent company is owned by the Yunnan provincial 
government, and officials in China have shown repeatedly that they are 
extremely reluctant to see their local champions fail….” 
Financial Times, Asia Edition, August 28, 2013 
The author of this article clearly expresses his view that the government will 
provide guarantees to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a view widely accepted 
by the public and assumed in many studies. However, the relationship between 
firm default probability and state ownership has not been directly examined in 
academia, although we can see some hints or indirect evidence from past 
studies. Using data from China, this paper provides strong evidence for the 
negative association between state ownership and firm default risk, and 
endeavors to help us better understand the roles of government, competitions 
and market development in the economy.   
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Throughout history, politicians and economists have debated the role of 
government in the economy. The mass of previous literature examined the 
effectiveness of state ownership and private ownership, providing strong 
empirical evidence for the advantages of private ownership (see Eckel and 
Vermaelen, 1986; Chen, et al., 2008; Firth, et al., 2010; etc.). Moreover, many 
studies show that there is significant improvement in operating performance or 
equity value after privatization (Megginson and Netter (2001) summarize 
earlier findings; Sun and Tong, 2003; Megginson, et al., 2004; Boubakri, et 
al., 2011; etc.). However, the impact of state ownership on default risk has not 
been investigated.  
The objective function that the government faces differs from that of private 
investors. The government might need to maximize social welfare, maintain a 
high employment rate, improve education and infrastructure, maintain the 
stability of society, and provide support to some industries of strategic 
importance to the country. SOEs play a crucial role for the government to 
achieve these goals. Thus, the government is reluctant to allow these firms to 
default and might provide guarantees for SOEs. This phenomenon is known as 
a soft budget constraint, a term first introduced by Kornai (1979, 1980, and 
1986). Kornai and many other economists believe that the soft budget 
constraint arises from various state-imposed policy burdens and is the major 
source of inefficiency for firms in socialist economies (Lin, et al., 1998; 
Berglof and Roland, 1998; and Frydman, et al., 2000; etc.).  In addition, some 
studies suggest that capitalist economies also have the soft budget constraints 
(Maskin, 1999; Kornai, et al., 2003). Government subsidies, soft taxation, soft 
credit and soft administrative prices are all means to soften the budget 
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constraint. Cull and Xu (2003) examine the two major methods of government 
bailout in China from 1980-1995: direct government transfers and loans from 
state-owned banks. They suggest that the bailout responsibilities were 
increasingly imposed on banks after 1990. Moreover, some studies provide 
indirect evidence for the soft budget constraint by comparing some 
characteristics of SOEs and non-SOEs. For example, Acharya and Kulkarni 
(2012) show supporting evidence that state-owned banks have access to 
stronger government guarantees and forbearance, by examining the deposit 
and lending growth of banks during the financial crisis. Borisova and 
Megginson (2011) and Borisova, et al. (2012), find that state ownership leads 
to lower cost of debt during the financial crisis due to the guarantee effect, 
using the European privatization and government investment sample, 
respectively. Therefore, due to the existence of a soft budget constraint, 
companies with higher state ownership might have a lower default risk. 
However, conversely, a soft budget constraint might worsen the moral hazard, 
increase the agency cost, lead to lower firm value, and thus lead to a higher 
risk of default.  Managers might not focus on firm value maximization, and 
instead will try to find the cash and credit subsidies from the government, and 
might give priority to the social and political goals of the government. 
Furthermore, state ownership provides a lower level of monitoring and the 
government guarantees also remove the monitoring incentive of other 
stakeholders (Bortolotti, et al., 2010). Also, the presence of a soft budget 
constraint will affect the firm’s investment behavior. SOEs might take more 
risky investment and have lower investment-cash flow sensitivities (Chow, et 
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al., 2010). Therefore, the agency costs arising from the soft budget constraint 
might lead to a higher default risk. 
Therefore, empirical investigation is needed for the association between state 
ownership and default risk due to the direct soft budget constraint effect and 
the agency cost effect arising from the soft budget constraint. In this paper, I 
present empirical evidence that state ownership leads to lower default risk, 
using Chinese listed firms’ data from 1990-2011. I find strong predicting 
power of state ownership on firm default events after controlling several 
popular measures of default risk. These measures of default risk include 
Altman’s (1968) Z-Score, Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default (DTD), and 
the Probability of Default (PD) of Duan, Sun and Wang (2012), which mainly 
incorporate firm’s financial and market information. I also test the effect of 
state ownership when a firm is facing global negative industry return, which 
can be viewed as an exogenous shock to the firm. I find that state ownership 
has a more significant effect on default risk during the shock period. This 
shock can be used to address potential endogeneity problem. 
To examine whether the negative association between state ownership and 
default risk is only driven by some SOEs in natural monopoly industries, I 
conduct regressions using different subsamples based on industry 
competitiveness.  I find that the effect for state ownership is more significant 
for firms in competitive industries. This finding helps differentiate the effect 
of state ownership with the effects of natural monopolies.  
I also test the effect of state ownership when the budget constraint becomes 
harder.  I find that state ownership has less effect for firms located in areas 
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with a better legal environment and less government intervention. The index 
of legal environment and government intervention is from Fan and Wang 
(2011). The results suggest that the effect of state ownership on default risk is 
less significant when the budget constraint becomes harder. Moreover, using 
the data of bank loans from China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR), I test one channel of the soft budget constraint. I find that firms 
with state ownership are more likely to get loans from state-owned banks.  
There are several reasons why I use Chinese data in this study. First of all, 
state ownership is still very popular among Chinese firms and more than 60% 
of listed firms in China are SOEs. According to an Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) study by Christiansen (2011), there 
are only 48 listed SOEs among 27 countries. Thus, China-listed firms provide 
a large sample for analysis. Secondly, Chinese SOEs cover almost every 
industry sector, whereas among the 27 OECD countries, almost 75% of SOEs 
are in the utilities and financial sectors. Firms in the utility sector are probably 
natural monopolies and financial institutions play a special role in the 
economy. Thus, using Chinese data, it is possible to examine the state 
ownership effect and to avoid the natural monopoly effect and the financial 
sector effect. Thirdly, in the geographic dimension, there are significant 
differences among different regions in terms of market development.  Thus we 
can examine the effect of state ownership under different legal environments 
and market development levels. This helps us better understand the role of 
government and the role of the market.    
This paper contributes to the literature on government guarantees. In previous 
studies, it is assumed that government provides a guarantee to SOEs and is 
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reluctant to allow SOEs to default. Although this view is widely accepted by 
the public, the direct empirical evidence is missing. This paper is the first to 
directly test the effect of state ownership on default risk, and provide evidence 
that the presence of state ownership leads to lower default probability. The 
finding could help us better understand the role of government in the 
economy. Moreover, this paper makes contributions to the default forecast 
literature. Previous default forecast models mainly incorporate a firm’s 
financial and market information. This study suggests that the ownership 
structure, which might affect firm value over a longer period of time, should 
also be incorporated into the forecast model, at least into the forecast model 
with the longer time window. 
Most previous studies on state ownership focus on effectiveness, and only two 
papers (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Borisova, et al., 2012) examine the 
association between tate ownership and cost of debt, areas which are the 
closest to this study. This paper differs from their studies in several aspects. 
Firstly, the samples are different. Borisova and Megginson (2011) use the 
European privatization sample, and Borisova, et al. (2012) use the European 
government investment sample. Nearly 60% of the observations in Borisova 
and Megginson (2011) are for banks, and 34% of the investment deals are in 
the financial sector in Borisova, et al. (2012). My sample includes all the 
Chinese listed firms with data available on CSMAR and the National 
University of Singapore Risk Management Institute (NUS-RMI) database 
(NUS-RMI, 2013). And only 29 firms are in the financial sector. Because of 
the different economic roles of financial firms and non-financial firms in 
society, they should have different abilities to access government guarantees. 
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Secondly, our findings are different. Borisova and Megginson (2011) find that 
state ownership leads to lower cost of debt, but fully privatized firms (zero 
state ownership) have lower cost debt compared to partially privatized firms. 
And Borisova, et al. (2012) find a negative association between state 
ownership and cost of debt only during a financial crisis period. The results in 
this paper suggest a linear relationship between state ownership and default 
risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces some background on Chinese SOEs. 
Section 4 describes data and summary statistics. Section 5 performs and 
discusses empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.2. Hypotheses Development 
It is widely accepted by the public that the government will provide guarantees 
to SOEs and is reluctant to allow SOEs to default. This phenomenon is 
referred to as soft budget constraint, in many studies.  The motivation for the 
government is to achieve its social and political goals, such as maintaining the 
employment rate, improving education and medical services, supporting 
industry sectors of strategic importance to the safety of the country. 
Government guarantees through bank loans, fiscal subsidies, and soft taxation 
might lead to lower default risk. However, on the other hand, the presence of 
soft budget constraints might worsen the managerial moral hazard and 
increase agency costs. The corporate governance problem arising from soft 
budget constraint might increase the firm’s default risk. Thus, the relationship 
between state ownership and default risk is still an empirical question. In 
8 
 
China, the legal system is not well developed, and a modern corporate 
governance scheme has yet to be established in both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Many non-SOEs are family-owned firms, and might suffer more severe moral 
hazard problems. Thus, the government guarantee effect might be more 
significant than the agency cost effect arising from the soft budget constraint, 
for Chinese firms. We could expect that firms with state ownership have lower 
default risk. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The presence of state ownership leads to lower 
probability of default. 
I can conduct a test to examine the effect of state ownership when the firm is 
facing global negative industry return, which can be viewed as an exogenous 
shock to the firm. If the negative association between state ownership and 
default risk is due to the soft budget constraint, we could expect that the effect 
of state ownership will be stronger during the shock period.  This shock to 
default risk can be used to deal with potential endogeneity problem.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): State ownership has more significant effect on 
default risk when firms are facing global negative industry shock. 
Since many SOEs are in concentrated industries such as utilities, natural 
resources and telecommunications, the negative association between state 
ownership and default risk might be driven by those SOEs. To differentiate the 
government soft budget constraint effect and the natural monopoly effect, we 
can test the relationship using different subsamples based on industry 
competitiveness. And due to the soft budget constraint, we could expect that 
state ownership still would have a significant effect for firms in competitive 
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industries. Furthermore, because of the strong competition, SOEs operating in 
competitive industries are more likely to acquire government guarantees, and 
the state ownership effect will be stronger in competitive industries.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of state ownership is more significant for 
firms in competitive industries. 
Moreover, in an environment with a better legal system and less government 
intervention, the budget constraint will be much harder. Fan and Wang (2011) 
provide a marketization index for China’s provinces, which is widely used in 
research on China. Among the 23 indicators of the comprehensive index, there 
is one indicator for the legal environment, and another one for government 
intervention. The two indicators are based on the survey of more than 4,000 
enterprises in China. Using the two indicators, we can test the effect of state 
ownership under different legal and market environments; and, we could 
expect that the effect of state ownership is less significant for firms located in 
regions with a better legal environment and less government interventions.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The effect of state ownership is less significant for 
firms located in regions with a better legal environment and less 
government intervention. 
 
1.3. Some Background on Chinese SOEs 
1.3.1. Overview 
The state sector in China includes the following categories: 1) enterprises 
managed by the State-owned Assets and Supervision and Administration 
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Commission (SASAC) of the State Council, provincial SASACs and 
municipal SASACs, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), or government ministries such as Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of Education; 2) enterprises effectively controlled by 
SOEs or their subsidies; 3) urban collective enterprises and village enterprises. 
Usually, the first two categories are considered as SOEs. Central SOEs include 
entities managed by SASAC of the State Council; state-owned financial 
institutions supervised by CBRC, CIRC, CSRC; entities owned by central 
government ministries. When China was a centrally planned economy, SOEs 
were fully owned by the state. Nowadays, the SOEs refer to state-owned and 
state-holding enterprises. After nearly 35 years of privatization, restructuring, 
joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, the ownership structure of SOEs has 
become much more complicated, and thus it is difficult to clearly define the 
state shares and to provide accurate statistics on SOEs. According to OECD 
(2009), a study of Chinese SOEs, it is difficult to find a consistent data set that 
could distinguish between state-owned and non-state-owned legal entity 
shares. And based on this study, 70% of listed Chinese non-financial firms are 
SOEs in 2004, by identity of the largest shareholders. By the end of 2008, 
there are 149 central SOEs controlled by SASAC of the State Council, and the 
subsidies of these central SOEs might exceed 10,000.  
The contribution of SOEs on gross domestic product (GDP) is large. Based on 
a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
performed by Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011), SOEs accounted for 45% of non-
agricultural GDP and 40% of GDP in 2007. For employment, pure SOEs 
11 
 
(fully owned by the SASACs or government ministries) account for nearly 
30% of the urban employment rate in 2009, based on the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. Although there is a clear diminishing trend of SOEs’ 
contribution, SOEs still remain a significant component in the economy. 
Strategic industries, which are important to China’s economic and national 
security, including defense, electric power and grid, petroleum and 
petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and shipping, are 
wholly or largely controlled by the state. For some other important industries, 
so-called pillar industries, including equipment manufacturing, auto, 
information technology, construction, chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals, and surveying and design, the state holds significant ownership, not 
majority ownership. For historical reasons, SOEs still exist in other industries, 
such as food and beverage, hostel. SOEs are present in almost all the 
industries.  
The government maintains significant influence over SOEs. The government 
decides on the appointments of top executives of SOEs and on their future 
career paths after leaving the SOE. Thus, the executives of SOEs have strong 
incentives to follow the government’s policy and to achieve the social and 
political goals of the government. SOEs, as an instrument of government 
policy, play significant roles in technology innovation (high speed rail), 
importing raw materials from other countries, and will continue their 
important role in the Chinese economy. 
1.3.2. History of SOE reform 
SOE reform since 1978 can be divided into two stages: 
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Stage 1: 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to 1978, the government determined 
the production level of SOEs. SOE reform was focused on revitalization 
by giving incentives and providing managers with more decision-making 
power. At this stage, the SOEs had more flexibility in production and 
could make adjustments to their production plans based on market 
information. Moreover, SOEs started to establish the Manager 
Responsibility System in the late 1980s. Under this system, the manager 
took full responsibility for the SOE’s operation and the government should 
not intervene in the SOE’s decision making. However, at this stage, there 
was no significant change in the ownership structure and governance 
structure, and the low efficiency problem had not been solved. SOEs’ 
profitability was decreasing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According 
to OECD (2009), in 1997, 6,599 companies out of about 22,000 large- and 
medium-sized SOEs recorded losses. SOE reform became a priority for the 
premier, Zhu Rongji.  
Stage 2: Since 1997, when Zhu Rongji became the premier of China. First 
of all, the government realized that it could not manage so many SOEs, 
and therefore adopted the strategy “Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (Keep the larger 
SOEs, release the smaller SOEs). The smaller SOEs were allowed to go 
bankrupt, to be acquired or become privatized. Secondly, to enhance SOE 
performance, the government implemented strategies such as huge layoffs, 
debt reduction, and technology improvement. Thirdly, four Asset 
Management Corporations were established to deal with the bad loans of 
the four largest state-owned banks. By the end of 2001, 4,000 out of 6,599 
money-losing SOEs earned positive net profits (OECD, 2009). At the same 
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time, the ownership structure and corporate governance structure started to 
reform. According to OECD (2009), the SOEs began to establish the 
“Modern Enterprises System”: 1) clarification of property rights; 2) 
clarification of rights and responsibilities; 3) separation of politics and 
business; and 4) scientific management. SOEs were encouraged to be 
listed in stock exchanges and raise capital from the public. 
1.3.3. SOEs in other countries 
According to an OECD study conducted by Christiansen (2011), there are only 
48 listed SOEs in 27 OECD countries. In terms of sectoral distribution, most 
of the listed SOEs are in the utilities sectors, while some are financial 
institutions. In fact, due to the financial crisis, Germany and the United 
Kingdom have become minority owners of large financial institutions. Only 
Finland, France, Italy, Norway and Poland maintain minority state ownership 
in listed manufacturing companies. Around half of all SOEs, including non-
listed SOEs, are in the network sectors (transportation, power generation and 
other energies). Financial institutions account for one-fourth of SOEs’ total 
valuation. For some Scandinavian nations or countries that have recently made 
a transition towards market economies, such as the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Israel, Poland and Norway, SOEs account for 20% to 30% of the GDP. On 
average, for the 27 countries studied in Christiansen (2011), SOEs account for 
15% of the GDP.  
Also according to Christiansen (2011), for the 27 OECD countries, there are 
two types of state-owned shares: those directly held by the state; those held by 
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state-controlled financial institutions such as government-owned insurance 
and pension schemes, and government-owned investment funds.  
1.4. Data and Summary Statistics 
1.4.1. Data and sample selection 
The sample includes all listed firms in China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange with relevant data available in CSMAR, a widely 
used Chinese financial database, and the NUS-RMI database.  The Credit 
Research Initiative database of the Risk Management Institute (RMI) of the 
National University of Singapore provides several measures of default 
probability, such as Probability of Default (PD) and Distance-to-Default 
(DTD). Moreover, the RMI database also provides comprehensive information 
on both market data and financial data on about 60,000 exchange-listed firms 
of 106 economies around the world. I retrieved the data used in this paper 
from the RMI database in January 2012. For those firms with both A shares 
and B shares traded on the stock exchange, I only include observations for A 
shares. I obtain the state share data and the firm ultimate controlling 
shareholder data from CSMAR. After the split share reform introduced in 
2005, non-tradable shares become tradable, but the tradable state shares are 
not recorded in CSMAR. Thus, only the state share data before the split share 
reform are used for analysis. I also define SOE based on the type of firm 
ultimate-controlling shareholder. I merge the ownership data with the RMI 




1.4.2. State ownership 
China’s two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, were established in 1990. There are two types of shares 
traded on these exchanges: A shares (RMB-denominated) and B shares 
(foreign currency-denominated). Under the split share structure, established 
from the beginning, A shares are further divided into tradable shares and non-
tradable shares. In 1990, approximately two-thirds of the A shares are non-
tradable shares. The two major holders of non-tradable shares are the state 
(government departments and agencies) and legal entities (the underlying 
companies and executives) (Guo and Keown, 2009).  In April 2005, the 
Chinese government initiated a split share structure reform to convert all non-
tradable shares into tradable shares. By the end of 2007, the reform was 
complete for most companies, which represent over 97% of the total A-share 
market capitalization (Li, et al., 2011).  
In this paper, I construct two variables for state ownership. The first is a 
dummy variable, SOE. A firm is defined as SOE if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is: 1) SASAC of the State Council, provincial SASACs or 
municipal SASACs; 2) CBRC, CIRC, or CSRC; 3) government ministries; 4) 
Other SOEs. The ultimate controlling shareholder information is available on 
the CSMAR database and is extracted from firm annual reports. The yearly 
data are available from 2003 to now. Since the listed firms usually are large 
and there is almost no complete privatization of large SOEs before 2003, I 
assume for years before 2003, the ultimate controlling shareholder is the same 
as that in 2003. I also define the central SOEs based on the ultimate 
controlling shareholders. CSMAR’s definition of controlling shareholder is 
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based on CSRC’s Administration of Takeover of Listed Companies 
Procedures. That is, a shareholder is classified as controlling shareholder if he 
satisfies any one of the following scenarios: 1) the one holds more than 50% 
of the total shares; 2) the one who holds more than 30% of the voting rights; 3) 
the one who can decide the appointments of over half of the board directors in 
a listed company. The ultimate controlling shareholder is the last layer of the 
shareholding relation chain. 
The other state ownership variable is the percentage of state shares, defined as 
the ratio of the number of state-owned shares divided by the total number of 
shares. The state-owned shares are non-tradable shares owned by the state. 
After the split share structure reform, the non-tradable shares become tradable 
shares, and many shares are owned by other state-owned companies, making 
the ownership structure much more complicated. Thus the state share is very 
difficult to define clearly. In my sample, only the state share data before the 
reform are included.  
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for SOE. The percentage 
of SOEs is more than 60% for the years before 2009. Then it decreases to 
around 40% after 2009, probably due to the state share reduction in the split 
share reform and the state share transmission reform starting from 2009. The 
statistics are similar to OECD (2009). Panel B reports the summary statistics 
for state shares. Approximately, 70% of the total companies have state-owned 
shares. The mean of state shares is in the range of (0.265, 0.360). The mean of 
the state shares of the whole sample is 35.1%, from Panel E, and the standard 
deviation is 26.1%, statistics almost the same as those in Li, et al. (2011). 
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Among all the observations, 25% are below 3.6% and almost 50% are above 
40%.  
The first variable SOE, the dummy variable, is defined based on the control 
rights, while the second one State Shares uses ownership data. To investigate 
the correlation of the two variables, I examine the state share distribution of 
SOE sample and non-SOE sample. The results are presented in Panel C and 
Panel D. The mean of state shares of SOE sample (SOE = 1) is 43.2%, while 
the mean of non-SOE sample is 18.4%. Panel C also reports the mean of state 
shares by year. In most years, the mean of state shares for SOE sample is 
higher than 40%, which is much higher than non-SOE sample. From 1997, the 
difference between the two samples is increasing, probably due to the SOE 
reform “Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (Keep the larger SOEs and release the smaller 
SOEs). Panel D reports more details for the comparison. For SOE sample, 
almost 75% of the observations have more than 30% state shares. Among the 
observations of non-SOE sample, 50% are below 4.2%.  
1.4.3. Default events 
The dependent variable in the main regressions is Default, a dummy variable 
indicating the happening of default events. The default events are extracted 
from the RMI database. These events are collected from many resources, 
including Bloomberg, Wind Financial database, Compustat, The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Moody’s reports, Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ), exchange web sites and news sources. A challenging problem is 
that the definition of default might vary across different data sources. RMI 
applies a default definition consistently across different economies. Based on 
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the RMI technical report (2013), the default events can be classified under one 
of the following events: 
1. Legal impasse to the timely settlement of interest or principal 
payments, such as bankruptcy filing, receivership, administration, 
liquidation;  
2. Missed or delayed payments of interest or principal, not including 
delayed payments made within a grace period; 
3. Debt restructuring or distressed exchange, in which a new security 
or package of securities is offered to debt holders, resulting in a 
diminished financial obligation (such as a conversion of debt to 
equity, debt with lower coupon or par value, debt with lower 
seniority, debt with longer maturity). 
1.4.4. Measures of default probability 
The main control variables used in my analysis are several popular default risk 
measures from previous default risk models: 
Z-Score: Altman’s Z-Score is calculated by the following equation: 










where ߚ௝are the discriminant coefficients and ௝ܺ௧  are discriminant variables. 
Altman’s variables include five accounting ratios: working capital to total 
assets (WC/TA), retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/TA), market equity to total liabilities 
(ME/TL), and sales to total assets (SL/TA). In calculating Altman’s Z-score 
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for a developing country (China in this paper), the variable SL/TA, is not used.  
Distance-to-Default (DTD): Based on Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default 
model, distance-to-default measures the distance between the current value of 











where Vt denotes the current value of assets, L denotes the liabilities, and  
 
is the asset volatility. These data are available in the RMI database. Duan and 
Wang (2012) discuss the estimation methods for DTD calculation. For 
financial and properties firms, which typically have higher leverage, the KMV 
Corporation’s estimation seems ill-suited. Thus, a transformed-data maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) approach is applied to the DTD calculation in the 
RMI database. 
Probability of Default (PD): Duan, et al. (2012) propose a forward intensity 
approach for the prediction of corporate defaults over different future periods. 
And the prediction is very accurate for short periods, with the accuracy ratios 
exceeding 90% for 1- and 3-month horizons and 80% for 6- and 12-month 
horizons using U.S. data. The accuracy ratio decreases when the horizon is 
increased to two or three years, but its performance remains reasonable. This 
measure incorporates the profit, liquidity and market information of the firm. 
The data are available on the RMI database. The PD for a 1-year horizon is 




1.4.5. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1.1 Panel E reports the summary statistics for the variables in the main 
regressions. All the variables except SOE, State Shares, Default and PD are 
winsorized at 1%. The default ratio is calculated as the number of defaults 
divided by the total number of firm-year observations. The default ratio for the 
whole sample is 2.0%. Based on Panel F, the default ratio for SOEs is 1.4%, 
while non-SOEs’ default ratio is 2.6%. Non-SOEs have a significantly higher 
default ratio.  
I divide the whole sample into quartiles Q1 to Q4 based on the state shares. Q1 
represents the quartile with smallest state share, and Q4 represents the largest 
state share quartile. Panel G of Table 1.1 reports the default ratio of these four 
subsamples. The default ratio of Q1 is 0.036, which is significantly higher 
than that of Q4 (0.01), suggesting that firms with lower state ownership have a 
larger likelihood to default. The t-statistic for equality test (Q1 vs. Q4) is 5.95, 
which is significant at the 1% level.  
Panel H describes the state ownership and default ratio in terms of industry 
sectors. The sample covers almost all the industry sectors, and only 29 
financial firms (1.4% of the total number of firms) are included. The 
Properties sector has the second lowest percentage of SOEs (52.7%), and the 
highest default ratio (4.1%, much higher than the average 2%). This table also 
suggests a negative association between state ownership and default risk. 
Appendix 2 reports the state ownership and default ratio in terms of a much 
narrower industry classification.  
 [Insert Table 1.1 Here] 
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Table 1.2 presents the Spearman rank correlation matrix. The correlation 
between Default and State Shares is -0.061, and is significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting a negative association between state ownership and default risk. 
The correlations between Default and PD, Z Score and DTD are 0.158, -0.160 
and -0.071, respectively, and all are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
these several previous measures of default probability work very well.  These 
measures capture the firm’s liquidity, profit, competitive position in the 
industry and market information, and will be the main control variables in the 
following regression analysis.  
 [Insert Table 1.2 Here] 
1.5. Empirical Results 
In this section, I first test the predicting power of state ownership on corporate 
default events. To address the potential endogeneity problem, I examine the 
effect of state ownership when firms are facing shocks on default risk. 
Moreover, the effect of state ownership under different industry 
competitiveness is investigated. I also examine the effect of state ownership 
for the firms located in regions with a better legal environment and less 
government intervention, when the budget constraints become harder. In 
addition, I use the data on bank loans from CSMAR to test whether firms with 
state ownership could more easily obtain loans from banks or state-owned 




1.5.1. The predicting power of state ownership on corporate     
default events 
Using probit regressions, I test the predicting power of state ownership on a 
corporate default event.  I employ the following yearly regression model:  
Defaultit+1 = δ0 + δ1StateOwnershipit + δ2ZScoreit + δ3DTDit + δ4PDit  
+ δ5 Other Controls + Fixed Effect  
+e1it,      
where the dependent variable Defaultit+1 is a dummy variable indicating the 
presence of corporate default events in year t+1. The coefficient on state 
ownership is expected to be negative due to the soft budge constraint effect, 
which suggests the government will provide a guarantee for firms with state 
ownership. 
The regression results are reported in Table 1.3. I include industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects for all four regressions. In column (1), after 
controlling for PD, the coefficient on SOE is -0.240 (z-statistics = -3.93), 
which is negative and significant at the 1% level, providing evidence for 
Hypothesis 1 that the presence of state ownership leads to lower default risk. 
In column (2), after controlling PD, DTD and Z Score, the coefficient on SOE 
is still negative and significant (-0.254, z = -3.55). I include SOE_Central in 
column (3), but the coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that 
central state ownership does not have a stronger effect on firm default risk. 
The possible reason might be that local SOEs still could access local 
government guarantees, and thus there is no significant difference in default 
risk between central SOEs and local SOEs. In column (4), I add more control 
variables, several firms’ standard financial variables, such as Size, Market-to-
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book ratio, Profit margin, ROA, Leverage. The coefficient on SOE (-0.354. z 
= -4.55) is still negative and significant. There is almost no change in the 
coefficients on SOE when I use different control variable sets.  
As expected, the coefficient on PD is positive and significant for all 
regressions, and the coefficient on DTD is negative and significant. Since the 
PD, Z Score and DTD have included the information on firm’s liquidity, profit 
and market returns, the coefficients on many financial variables in column (4) 
are not significant. In the following regressions, I only include PD as the main 
control variable.  
 [Insert Table 1.3 Here] 
1.5.2. The effect of state ownership when a firm is facing global 
negative industry shock 
The global negative industry return can be viewed as an exogenous shock to 
firm default risk. If state ownership does have an effect on the default risk, we 
could expect that the effect will be stronger during the negative industry shock 
period. This also can address potential endogeneity problem caused by some 
unobservable variables. In particular, state ownership and default risk might be 
both determined by some unobserved firm or industry characteristics. For 
example, natural monopolies usually have lower default risk by nature, but at 
the same time they also have higher state ownership.  
I define the negative industry shock as an event when the industry return for 
the last year is smaller than -10%. The industry return is calculated as the 
mean of stock returns of all the firms from 30 economies of the world, with 
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the data available on the NUS-RMI database. The database covers the major 
economies from North America, Europe and Asia, such as the U.S., U.K., 
China, Japan, Germany, and France. The industry is defined based on the 
Bloomberg Industry Subgroup Classification. Since the industry return is 
calculated globally, the event can be viewed as an exogenous shock to firm 
default risk to the specific firm.  
Table 1.4 reports the regression results. The sample of column (1) only 
includes observations with a negative industry shock, and the sample of 
column (2) includes observations without negative shocks. I use the dummy 
variable State_Dummy to indicate the presence of state ownership (equals 1 
when the state share is not 0). The coefficient on State_Dummy is negative and 
significant at the 1% level (-0.503, z = -2.72). However, the coefficient on 
state ownership is not significant in column (2). The combination of columns 
(1) and (2) shows the supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2, that the effect of 
state ownership is stronger when firms are facing shocks on default risk. Using 
the whole sample, I add the interaction term State_Dummy*Negative Industry 
Shock in column (3). The Negative Industry Shock is a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of the industry shock. The coefficient on this 
interaction term is negative and significant (-0.402, z = -1.78), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. 
 [Insert Table 1.4 Here] 
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1.5.3. The reduction of state shares 
There is possibility that the government can choose the companies which have 
lower default risk. To address this concern, I investigate the motivation of the 
government behind the events of the reductions in state shares.  
First, I construct a reduction sample including the events that there is a 
reduction in state shares of a company in a year.  Then I compare some firm-
specific characteristics before the reduction in state shares of the reduction 
sample and the whole sample. The results are reported in Table 1.5. It shows 
that the government reduces the state shares of smaller SOEs, even when the 
smaller SOEs have larger profit margin and higher ROA. The mean of Size of 
the reduction sample (Size=20.92) is significantly smaller than that of the 
whole sample (Size=21.31). The reduction might be because the SOE reform 
“Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (Keep the larger SOEs and release the smaller SOEs) 
started by Premier Zhu Rongji.   
For the reduction sample, I further divide it into three subsamples: 1), PD 
increases by more than 10% after the reduction; 2), PD decreases by more 
than 10%; 3), the change in PD is less than 10%. Then I compare the firm 
characteristics before the reduction of the subsample 1) and 3). Table 1.5 also 
reports this comparison. The difference in Size is significant, suggesting that 
larger firms are more likely to have a decrease in default risk. Before the 
reduction, the firms with higher past stock return, higher Market-book ratio 
and lower leverage are more likely to have an increase in PD.  This might be 
because the firms with higher past stock return possibly will have lower return 
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in the future. In general, the findings do not support the argument that the 
government will choose the companies with lower default risk.  
[Insert Table 1.5 Here] 
1.5.4. The effect of state ownership under different industry 
competitiveness environments 
Many SOEs are in natural monopoly industries or the financial industry. Due 
to the special roles of natural monopolies and financial institutions in the 
economy, they have more access to government guarantees. Thus, the negative 
association between state ownership and default risk might be driven by the 
natural monopoly effect or the financial sector effect, not the soft budget 
constraint effect. To address this concern, I examine the effect of state 
ownership under different industry competitiveness environments.  
There are two interesting questions here. First of all, does state ownership still 
have an effect on default risk in competitive industries? If the negative 
association is driven by the SOEs in concentrated industries, state ownership 
will not have an effect in competitive industries. Secondly, does state 
ownership have a more significant effect on default risk in competitive 
industries? SOEs operating in competitive industries face stronger competition 
from private firms, and they are more likely to acquire government guarantees. 
Thus, we could expect that the effect of state ownership should be stronger for 
firms in competitive industries. 
I use two definitions for competitive industries: 1) HHI is smaller than the 
median value; 2) HHI is smaller than 0.15. The industries are defined based on 
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CSMAR Industry B classification (166 industry sectors). HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of the firms in the same industry. Table 1.6 presents the analysis 
results. Column (1) uses the competitive industry sample based on definition 
1. Column (2) uses the non-competitive industry sample based on definition 1. 
Based on definition 2, the competitive industry sample is used in column (3) 
and the non-competitive industry sample is used in column (4). The coefficient 
on SOE for column (1) is -0.282 and significant at the 1% level. But the 
coefficient in column (2) is not significant, suggesting that the effect of state 
ownership is stronger for competitive industries and providing evidence for 
Hypothesis 3. Similarly, the coefficient on SOE in column (4) is not 
significant, while the coefficient is negative and significant in column (3).  
 [Insert Table 1.6 Here] 
1.5.5. The effect of state ownership when budget constraint 
becomes harder 
Budget constraints are much harder for firms located in regions with less 
government intervention and a better legal environment. The indicators of 
government intervention and legal environment are from Fan and Wang 
(2011),1 and the two indicators are based on the survey of more than 4,000 
enterprises in China. Using the two indicators, I test the effects of state 
ownership under different legal and market environments and the results are 
                                                            
1 Fan and Wang (2011) provide a marketization index at the provincial level, which captures 
the regional market development of the following aspects: 1) relationship between 
government and market; 2) development of non-state business; 3) development of product 
market; 4) development of factor market; 5) development of market intermediaries and legal 
environment. There are 23 indicators included in the comprehensive marketization index. The 
data are either from statistics or enterprise and household surveys. 
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presented in Table 1.7. GovInterventionit is a dummy variable, which equals 1 
when the government intervention index for the region is greater than the 
median value of all the regions at year t. In column (1), the coefficient on the 
interaction term SOE*GovIntervention is positive but not significant. 
However, in column (3), using the state share variable, the coefficient on the 
interaction term State*GovIntervention is 0.512 and statistically significant, 
suggesting that state ownership has less effect on firms located in regions with 
less government intervention. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction 
term SOE*LegalEnviron is 0.256 and significant in column (2). In column (4), 
the coefficient on State*LegalEnviron is 0.650 (z = 2.17), which is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. LegalEnviron is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 when the legal environment index for the region is greater than the 
median value of all the regions at year t. This table reports evidence for 
Hypothesis 4.  
 [Insert Table 1.7 Here] 
1.5.6. State ownership and the probability of obtaining bank 
loans 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, loans from state-owned banks are one of the 
major channels of soft budget constraints (Cull and Xu, 2003). Using the data 
on bank loans from CSMAR from 1990 to 2006, I can examine whether firms 
with state ownership have a larger likelihood of obtaining loans from banks or 
state-owned banks. I conduct a probit regression using the following model: 
BankLoanit+1 = δ0 + δ1StateOwnershipit + δ2 Other Controls + Fixed Effects + 
e2it,      
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StateBankLoanit+1 = δ0 + δ1StateOwnershipit + δ2 Other Controls + Fixed 
Effects + e3it,   
where BankLoan is an indicator of obtaining loans from banks and 
StateBankLoan is the indicator of obtaining loans from state-owned banks. 
Since state-owned banks are more likely to be affected by the government 
(Dinc, 2005; La Porta, et al., 2002), we could expect that firms with state 
ownership have a larger likelihood of getting loans from state-owned banks. 
The effect of state ownership on the probability of obtaining loans from all 
banks still needs empirical investigation since government guarantees are more 
likely through the channel of state-owned banks. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 1.8. The coefficient on state 
ownership in column (2) is 0.212 (z = 1.91), which is positive and significant, 
providing supporting evidence that firms with state ownership are more likely 
to get loans from state-owned banks. This also provides evidence for one of the 
channels of soft budget constraints for firms with state ownership. Although 
the coefficient on state ownership (0.037) is positive, it is not significant, 
suggesting that private firms could obtain loans from non-state-owned banks. 
Based on some unreported regression results, the bank loan interest for firms 
with state ownership is not significantly higher than that of other firms. The 
reason might be that the bank loan interest is controlled by the central 
government during the sample time period. 




1.5.7. Discussions on the dummy variable SOE 
The dummy variable SOE is defined based on firm’s controlling shareholder. 
Although I have shown the high correlation between SOE and state shares, 
there are still some concerns. Firstly, the definition of SOE using control rights 
is very strict. It usually requires the firm has more than 30% state shares. 
There are some possibilities that some firms with high state ownership are 
classified as non-SOEs. Secondly, the findings that firms controlled by the 
government have lower default risk might not be generalized to firms with 
state shares. The controlling effect might be stronger than the ownership effect. 
In the regressions not reported in the paper, I conduct analysis directly using 
data on state shares before the split stock reform. I find that higher state shares 
lead to lower default risk. The state shares are absolute values, not dummy 
variables based on some criteria. This provides evidence for the ownership 
effect.  
1.6. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to directly test the association between state ownership 
and firm default risk. I find that the presence of state ownership leads to lower 
default risk due to the soft budget constraints. And the effect of state 
ownership is more significant for firms operating in competitive industries. 
Then, I examine the effects of state ownership when the budget constraint 
becomes harder. I find evidence that state ownership has a less significant 
effect for firms located in regions with less government intervention and a 
better legal environment. These results could help us better understand the role 
of government, competitions and market development. To address the 
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potential endogeneity problem, I examine the effects of state ownership on 
default risk when firms are facing negative shocks to default risk. I find that 
state ownership has a stronger effect on default risk when firms are facing 
global negative industry shock. In addition, this paper suggests that the 
ownership information should be incorporated into the default forecast model, 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
  
State Ownership  
  
SOE A dummy variable equals 1 when the company is classified 
as state-owned enterprise (SOE). A company is defined as 
SOE if the ultimate controlling shareholder is: 1) State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of the State Council, 2) China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), 3) China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC), 4) China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), 5) government ministries such as 
Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Education, 6) Provincial 
SASACs or municipal SASACs, 7) Other SOEs. The 
Ultimate Controlling Shareholder information is available on 
CSMAR database. In CSMAR, the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is defined as the standard of the Measures for 
Administration of Takeover of Listed Companies 
  
  
SOE_Central A dummy variable equals 1 when the company is classified 
as central SOE. Central SOEs include entities managed by 
SASAC of the State Council; state-owned financial 
institutions supervised by CBRC, CIRC, CSRC; entities 
owned by central government ministries; subsidies or 
departments of central SOEs. 
  
State Shares Calculated as the number of state-owned shares divided by 
the total number of shares. The state share data is available on 
CSMAR database and only the data before split share reform 
is used for analysis. 
  
  
Default Events  
  
Default Indicator of default events happening at year t. The default 
events are extracted from the RMI database. These events are 
collected from many resources, including Bloomberg, Wind 
Financial Database, Compustat, CRSP, Moody’s reports, 
TEJ, exchange web sites and news sources. The default 
events can be classified under one of the following events: 1, 
Legal impasse to the timely settlement of interest or principal 
payments, such as bankruptcy filing, receivership, 
administration, liquidation; 2, Missed or delayed payments of 
interest or principal, not including delayed payments made 
within a grace period; 3, Debt restructuring or distressed 
exchange, in which a new security or package of securities is 
offered to debt holders, resulting in a diminished financial 
obligation (such as a conversion of debt to equity, debt with 
lower coupon or par value, debt with lower seniority, debt 
with longer maturity). 
 
  
Measures of Firm 







PD Probability of Default in next 12 months. Duan, Sun and 
Wang (2012) proposed a forward intensity approach for the 
prediction of corporate defaults over different future periods. 
And the prediction is very accurate for short periods, with the 
accuracy ratios exceeding 90% for 1 and 3-month horizons 
and 80% for 6 and 12-month horizons using U.S. data. The 
accuracy deteriorates somewhat when the horizon is 
increased to two or three years, but its performance still 
remains reasonable. The data is available in the RMI 
database. The data from RMI database in this paper is 
retrieved in January of 2012. 
  
DTD Distance to Default. Based on Merton Distance to Default 
model, distance-to-default measures the distance between the 
current value of assets and the debt amount in terms of asset 
volatility. This data is available in the RMI database. 
  
Z-score Altman Z-score is calculated by the following equation: 









where ߚ௝are the discriminant coefficients and ௝ܺ௧ are 
discriminant variables. Original Altman’s variables include 
five accounting ratios: working capital to total assets 
(WC/TA), retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/TA), market 
equity to total liabilities (ME/TL), and sales to total assets 
(SL/TA). In calculating Altman’s Z-score for developing 
country(China in this paper), the variable SL/TA, is not used. 
  
Other Variables  
  
Size Calculated as log(1+Total Assets). 
  
Market to Book Calculated as (Total Liabilities+Market Value of 
Equity)/Total Assets. 
  
Profit Calculated as Net Income/Revenue. 
  
ROA Calculated as Operating Income/Total Assets. 
  
Growth Growth rate of Sales.  
  






Negative Industry Shock  A dummy variable equals 1 when the industry return is 
smaller than  
-10%. The industry return is defined as the mean of the firms’ 
stock returns in the same industry in the whole RMI database 
(30 countries). The stock price and market capitalization have 
been changed to US dollar before return calculation. The 








Change_Post A dummy variable equals 1 when the observation is after the 
negative change in state ownership.  
  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of industry 
competitiveness. HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares of the firms in the same industry. The 
industry is defined based on CSMAR Industry B 
Classification. 
  
GovIntervention Government Intervention. One component of Marketization 
Index from Fan and Wang (2011). The provincial level 
marketization index captures the regional market 
development of the following aspects: (1) relationship 
between government and market; (2) development of non-
state business; (3) development of product market; (4) 
development of factor market; (5) development of market 
intermediaries and legal environment. The level of 
government intervention is indicated by enterprise surveys of 
more than 4,000 firms.   
  
LegalEnviron Legal environment. One component of Marketization Index 
from Fan and Wang (2011). The level of legal environment is 
indicated by more than 4,000 company leaders’ judgments 
collected from enterprise surveys.  
  
Bank_Loan A dummy variable equals 1 when getting loans from banks. 
  
StateBank_Loan A dummy variable equals 1 when getting loans from state-
owned banks. The state-owned banks are: China Construction 
Bank, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of 
Communications, China Development Bank, Export-Import 

















Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. Variable 
definitions are presented in the Appendix 1. 
Panel A: Number of SOEs 












1994 28 16 0.571 2 0.071 
1995 272 169 0.621 15 0.055 
1996 309 189 0.612 17 0.055 
1997 509 312 0.613 26 0.051 
1998 715 468 0.655 31 0.043 
1999 814 556 0.683 35 0.043 
2000 913 616 0.675 40 0.044 
2001 1022 693 0.678 45 0.044 
2002 1082 746 0.689 47 0.043 
2003 1155 800 0.693 56 0.048 
2004 1192 832 0.698 84 0.070 
2005 1292 858 0.664 95 0.074 
2006 1292 836 0.647 90 0.070 
2007 1312 834 0.636 94 0.072 
2008 1356 831 0.613 106 0.078 
2009 1494 666 0.446 107 0.072 
2010 1608 697 0.433 128 0.080 










Panel B: State Shares (The state share data before the split share reform is used) 
Year Number of 
Firms 




Max Number of 
Firms with 
state shares 
Ratio of firms 
with state 
shares 
1991 13 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.591 0.793 8 0.615 
1992 58 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.258 0.593 0.939 35 0.603 
1993 191 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.391 0.593 0.905 133 0.696 
1994 301 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.374 0.577 0.886 214 0.711 
1995 334 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.568 0.886 238 0.713 
1996 543 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.542 0.886 392 0.722 
1997 760 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.383 0.571 0.886 570 0.750 
1998 867 0.346 0.000 0.000 0.378 0.578 0.886 648 0.747 
1999 966 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.573 0.886 713 0.738 
2000 1105 0.353 0.000 0.037 0.389 0.581 0.886 850 0.769 
2001 1180 0.359 0.000 0.057 0.399 0.585 0.886 916 0.776 
2002 1247 0.360 0.000 0.056 0.399 0.587 0.850 969 0.777 
2003 1307 0.353 0.000 0.054 0.392 0.582 0.850 1057 0.809 
2004 1403 0.350 0.000 0.059 0.389 0.577 0.850 1108 0.790 

























(Based on Controlling Shareholder) 
non-SOEs 
   
Mean of State shares 0.432 0.184 
   
Mean of State Shares 
By Year 
  
1991 0.347 0.198 
1992 0.367 0.237 
1993 0.415 0.250 
1994 0.404 0.237 
1995 0.399 0.235 
1996 0.389 0.245 
1997 0.414 0.246 
1998 0.408 0.232 
1999 0.412 0.203 
2000 0.428 0.201 
2001 0.441 0.193 
2002 0.440 0.192 
2003 0.444 0.156 
2004 0.458 0.124 
2005 0.450 0.112 
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Panel D: Distribution of state shares for SOE sample and non-SOE sample 
 
Sample Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
SOEs  
 
7714 0.432 0.235 0.293 0.484 0.618 















Panel E: Summary statistics for main variables in the analysis. 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
SOE 17738 0.612 0.487 0 1 1 
SOE_Central 17738 0.065 0.247 0 0 0 
State Shares  9691 0.351 0.261 0.036 0.387 0.582 
       
Default 18325 0.020 0.139 0 0 0 
       
PD 18325 0.024 0.027 0.009 0.018 0.031 
Z Score 12325 7.577 8.464 2.141 4.740 9.454 
DTD 16357 4.233 2.236 2.461 3.971 5.740 
       
Size 16808 21.19 1.041 20.48 21.07 21.79 
Market to Book 16749 2.400 1.391 1.412 1.997 2.965 
Profit 16776 0.067 0.214 0.0.024 0.067 0.135 
ROA 16806 0.042 0.065 0.015 0.043 0.073 
Growth 15189 0.205 0.445 -0.018 0.140 0.334 













Panel G: state shares and default ratio 
The sample is divided into four quartiles based on state shares. Q1 means smallest state share 
quartile and Q4 means largest state share quartile. Significance at a 10% (*), 5% (**), or level 









    
Test Equality 
t-statistics 
  SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs vs. Non-SOEs 
Default ratio 0.014 0.026 5.86*** 
  
Low state 





  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 vs. Q4 
Mean of 
state shares 0.001 0.242 0.488 0.671  
Default ratio 0.036 0.034 0.021 0.01 5.95*** 
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Panel H: SOE and default ratio by industry sectors.  
The industry classification is based on the CSMAR Industry Name A. The Appendix 2 
reports the results based on CSMAR Industry Name B.   









Conglomerates 343 0.521 0.058 0.025 
Properties 131 0.527 0.048 0.041 
Finance 29 0.536 0.027 0.017 
Industrials 1274 0.622 0.072 0.016 
Commerce 156 0.672 0.050 0.012 














Table 1.2 Spearman rank correlation (p- value in parentheses)
 State Default PD Z Score DTD Size Market 
to Book 
Profit ROA Growth Leverage 
State Shares 1           
Default -0.061 1          
 (<.0001)           
PD -0.090 0.158 1         
 (<.0001) (<.0001)          
Z Score 0.025 -0.160 -0.570 1        
 0.1369) (<.0001) (<.0001)         
DTD 0.047 -0.071 -0.355 0.663 1       
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)        
Size 0.177 -0.018 -0.170 -0.290 -0.225 1      
 (<.0001) (0.0927) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)       
Market to Book -0.038 -0.021 -0.125 0.526 0.485 -0.532 1     
 (.0004) (0.0537) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)      
Profit -0.047 -0.117 -0.373 0.475 0.281 -0.108 0.344 1    
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)     
ROA 0.016 -0.155 -0.464 0.474 0.292 -0.056 0.313 0.726 1   
 (0.1257) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)    
Growth -0.004 -0.064 -0.116 -0.024 -0.066 0.123 -0.015 0.155 0.305 1  
 (0.6951) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1848) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1862) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
Leverage -0.014 0.128 0.396 -0.818 -0.506 0.246 -0.309 -0.438 -0.443 0.063 1 
 (0.1942) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<0.0001)  
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Table 1.3  The default probability of SOEs 
This table reports the evidence of the predicting power of state ownership on firm default 
events. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 1.  All regressions include 
constant terms, year fixed effect and industry fixed effects. The sample period in this table is 
from 1990 to 2011. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z 
value in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Default Default Default Default 
     
SOE -0.240*** -0.254*** -0.264*** -0.354*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.55) (-3.55) (-4.55) 
SOE_Central   0.088  
   (0.58)  
PD 9.113*** 8.920*** 8.933*** 3.644* 
 (9.30) (8.22) (8.20) (1.83) 
DTD  -0.046** -0.046** 0.0195 
  (-2.43) (-2.41) (0.65) 
Z Score  0.000*** 0.000*** -0.0716*** 
  (3.48) (3.46) (-3.52) 
Size    -0.102 
    (-1.58) 
ROA    -1.097 
    (-1.42) 
Leverage    0.197 
    (0.55) 
Profit    -0.179 
    (-0.96) 
Market to Book    0.005 
    (0.10) 
Growth    -0.065 
    (-0.59) 
Constant -4.424*** -2.376*** -2.378*** -0.293 
 (-19.39) (-10.25) (-10.24) (-0.19) 
     
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 15,562 9,652 9,652 8,649 












Table 1.4 The effect of state ownership when firms are facing negative 
global industry shock. 
This table reports the effect of state ownership on firm default events when firms face 
negative global industry shocks. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 1. 
The sample of Model (1) includes observations with a global industry return smaller than -
10%.  The observations with a global industry return greater than -10% are included in the 
sample of Model (2). Model (3) includes all the observations. All regressions include constant 
terms, year fixed effect and industry fixed effects. The sample period in this table is from 
1990 to 2006. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z 
value in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Default Default Default 
    
State_Dummy -0.503*** -0.099 -0.106 
 (-2.72) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
State_Dummy * Negative Industry Shock   -0.402* 
   (-1.78) 
Negative Industry Shock   0.581*** 
   (2.78) 
Z Score 0.009 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (1.09) (2.74) (3.00) 
DTD -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.132*** 
 (-3.67) (-3.10) (-3.98) 
PD 9.097*** 5.607*** 6.360*** 
 (4.03) (3.93) (5.34) 
    
Constant -2.268*** -1.966*** -2.107*** 
 (-5.21) (-5.25) (-6.32) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    




































ROA Past  
Return 
Reduction Sample 20.92 2.39 0.467 0.256 0.104 0.0609 0.135 
Whole Sample 21.31 2.24 0.472 0.157 0.0648 0.0399 0.226 
        
Reduction: PD up 20.85 2.59 0.446 0.246 0.112 0.0643 0.199 
Reduction: PD down 20.98 2.37 0.469 0.286 0.108 0.0597 0.057 
Difference: T test -1.93* 2.31** -2.07** -1.21 0.33 1.26 3.9*** 
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Table 1.6  The effect of state ownership under different industry 
competitiveness environments 
This table reports the effect of state ownership on firm default events under different industry 
competitiveness environments. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 1. I 
use two definitions for competitive industries: 1. HHI is smaller than the median value; 2. HHI 
is smaller than 0.15. The industries are defined based on CSMAR Industry B classification. 
The Model (1) uses the competitive industry sample based on the definition 1. Model (2) uses 
the non-competitive industry sample based on definition 1. Based on definition 2, the 
competitive industry sample is used in Model (3) and the non-competitive industry sample is 
used in Model (4).  All regressions include constant terms, year fixed effect. The sample 
period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm 
clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. 
The table also reports z value in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Default Default Default Default 
     
SOE -0.282*** -0.088 -0.284*** -0.213 
 (-4.44) (-0.40) (-3.81) (-1.62) 
PD 9.070*** 14.856*** 8.929*** 8.890*** 
 (9.22) (4.11) (8.85) (3.96) 
     
Constant -4.426*** -2.425*** -5.007*** -1.963*** 
 (-19.52) (-7.92) (-25.15) (-11.25) 
     
Year Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,413 840 10,794 2,694 

















Table 1.7 The effect of state ownership under different market 
development environments 
This table reports the effect of state ownership on firm default events under different market 
development environments. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 1.  I use 
two components of the marketization index at provincial level from Fan and Wang (2011): 
Government Intervention and Legal Environment.  All regressions include constant terms, 
year fixed effect, industry fixed. The sample period for Model (1) and (2) is from 1990 to 
2011, and Model (3) and (4) use the sample period before the share split reform from 1990 to 
2006. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z value in 
parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Default Default Default Default 
     
SOE -0.307*** -0.479***   
 (-3.31) (-3.77)   
State Shares   -0.810*** -0.937*** 
   (-3.80) (-3.79) 
SOE*GovIntervention 0.098    
 (0.89)    
SOE*LegalEnviron  0.256*   
  (1.65)   
State*GovIntervention   0.512*  
   (1.88)  
State*LegalEnviron    0.650** 
    (2.17) 
GovIntervention -0.148*  -0.224**  
 (-1.72)  (-2.11)  
LegalEnviron  -0.192*  -0.283** 
  (-1.68)  (-2.43) 
PD 8.952*** 9.281*** 9.660*** 9.792*** 
 (9.29) (8.26) (8.51) (8.71) 
Constant -2.352*** -2.254*** -2.417*** -2.427*** 
 (-13.81) (-9.29) (-10.52) (-10.10) 
     
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 14,485 14,548 8,432 8,460 












Table 1.8 The effect of state ownership on the probability of getting bank 
loans 
This table reports the effect of state ownership on the probability of getting bank loans. 
Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 1.   All regressions include constant 
terms, year fixed effect, and industry fixed effect. The sample period in this table is from 2000 
to 2006. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z value in 
parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Bank_Loan StateBank_loan 
   
State Shares 0.037 0.212* 
 (0.36) (1.91) 
Size 0.009 -0.038 
 (0.22) (-0.85) 
Market to Book 0.066*** 0.045** 
 (3.19) (2.28) 
Cash 0.000 0.000 
 (0.49) (0.52) 
Growth 0.344*** 0.300*** 
 (5.76) (5.36) 
Profit 0.747** 1.173*** 
 (2.50) (2.98) 
Leverage -0.099** -0.062* 
 (-2.25) (-1.80) 
ROA -0.745* -1.273*** 
 (-1.87) (-2.96) 
CashFlow_Operating -0.000 -0.000** 
 (-1.45) (-2.05) 
Constant -2.007** -1.360 
 (-2.33) (-1.47) 
   
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
Observations 7,534 7,534 
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Appendix 2: State ownership and default ratio across different industries. The industry classification is based on CSMAR Industry 
Name B. 











Animal Ranching and Farming Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Poultry Hatcheries Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Support Services for Oil and Gas Extraction Public Utility 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Grain and Feedstuff Processing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Animal Slaughtering, Meat and Egg Processing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Other Food Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Hats Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Other Fabric Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.091 1 
Furs, Leather, Feather and Related Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Leather and Hide Tanning and Products Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Timber Processing and Bamboo,Rattan, Palm and Grass 
Products 
Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 5 
Furniture Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Culture and Education Goods, Sporting and Athletic Goods 
Manufacturing 
Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 7 
Coking Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Chemical Fertilizer Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.154 1 
Chemical Pesticide Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Synthetic Material Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
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Specialized Chemical Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 
Consumer Chemical Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.067 2 
Plastic Film Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Foamed Plastics, and Leatheroid and Synthesized Leather 
Manufacturing 
Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Cement and Asbestine Cement Products Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Metal Surface Treating and Heat Treating Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Metal Processing Machinery Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 
Petrochemicals and Related Industry Special Equipment 
Manufacturing 
Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.167 1 
Automobile Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.118 2 
Ship and Boat Building Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Electrical Machinery Manufacturing Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Power Transmission & Distribution Equipment and 
Controllers  Manufacturing 
Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 13 
Chinese Medicines Manufacturing Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 
Pipeline Transportation Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Computer Software Development and Consultation Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Wholesale of Machine and Electric Equipment Industrials 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Other Wholesale Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Textile, Clothing, Shoes and Hats Retail Commerce 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 
Retail of Consumer Product Commerce 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Intermediary Services for Real Estate Properties 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Architectural, Engineering Consulting Services Commerce 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
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Health Care,Nursing Care Services Conglomerates 0.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Professional, Scientific Research Services 
 
Commerce 0.161 0.129 0.000 9 
Other Special Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.167 0.167 0.000 4 
Printing Industrials 0.171 0.000 0.000 5 
Decoration Conglomerates 0.273 0.000 0.020 9 
Synthetic Fibre Manufacturing Industrials 0.308 0.000 0.000 2 
Support Services for Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, 
and Fishery 
Conglomerates 0.333 0.000 0.000 3 
Veneer and Plywood Manufacturing Industrials 0.333 0.000 0.000 1 
Medical Machinery Manufacturing Industrials 0.333 0.000 0.000 4 
Real Estate Management Properties 0.333 0.000 0.000 2 
Other Electronic Appliance Manufacturing Industrials 0.342 0.178 0.000 21 
Plastics Manufacturing Industrials 0.374 0.000 0.018 24 
Computer Application Service Conglomerates 0.381 0.076 0.034 70 
Biological Medicines Manufacturing Industrials 0.385 0.051 0.046 10 
Other Manufacturing Industrials 0.396 0.000 0.079 22 
Metal Products Industrials 0.399 0.098 0.016 29 
Communication Service Public Utility 0.400 0.363 0.037 15 
Garment and Other Fabric Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.405 0.065 0.011 19 
Wholesale of Medicine and Medical Appliance Commerce 0.429 0.357 0.045 5 
Other Communication and Cultural Industries Conglomerates 0.432 0.135 0.000 5 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.434 0.029 0.008 78 
Hotels Commerce 0.434 0.000 0.057 8 
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Banking Finance 0.464 0.000 0.000 11 
Other Public Services Commerce 0.471 0.000 0.000 5 
Medicine Manufacturing Conglomerates 0.473 0.013 0.017 104 
Food Processing Industrials 0.474 0.036 0.015 30 
Instruments and Appearances, Culture and  Office Machinery 
Manufacturing 
Industrials 0.475 0.091 0.010 14 
Textile Industrials 0.500 0.098 0.011 44 
Metal Structure Manufacturing Industrials 0.500 0.000 0.000 3 
Graziery Conglomerates 0.514 0.000 0.000 8 
Gas Production and Supply Public Utility 0.516 0.000 0.000 4 
Support Services for Mining Public Utility 0.526 0.316 0.000 5 
Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.526 0.137 0.029 47 
Estate Development and Operation Properties 0.531 0.049 0.042 128 
Conglomerates Conglomerates 0.537 0.070 0.030 59 
Vegetable oil Processing Industrials 0.538 0.000 0.000 1 
Rubber Parts and Supplies Manufacturing Industrials 0.538 0.000 0.000 1 
Bearing and Valve Manufacturing Industrials 0.538 0.000 0.000 1 
Financial Trusts Finance 0.548 0.000 0.032 2 
Biological Products Manufacturing Industrials 0.551 0.011 0.000 14 
Rental and Leasing Services Public Utility 0.556 0.000 0.037 4 
Securities and Futures Finance 0.560 0.060 0.034 13 
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting, Rolling, Drawing, And Extruding Industrials 0.568 0.059 0.016 50 
Fishing and Hunting Conglomerates 0.569 0.123 0.062 8 
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Coal Mining Public Utility 0.571 0.000 0.000 1 
Forestry Public Utility 0.574 0.000 0.043 4 
Electronic Components and Appliance Industrials 0.576 0.081 0.016 76 
Food Manufacturing Industrials 0.578 0.012 0.017 18 
Chemical Fibre Manufacturing Industrials 0.604 0.102 0.020 24 
Non-metallic Mineral Products Industrials 0.604 0.024 0.020 60 
Consumer Electronics Manufacturing Industrials 0.613 0.000 0.014 15 
Petroleum Processing & Coking Industrials 0.620 0.012 0.006 16 
Publishing Industries Public Utility 0.658 0.164 0.082 9 
Agriculture Conglomerates 0.662 0.156 0.044 20 
Wholesale of Metals Industrials 0.667 0.000 0.000 1 
Information Services Public Utility 0.667 0.000 0.036 11 
Nonferrous Metal  Mining Industrials 0.672 0.066 0.024 16 
Highway Transportation Public Utility 0.673 0.000 0.000 8 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.686 0.147 0.017 80 
Paper and Allied Products Industrials 0.688 0.019 0.014 26 
Retail Trade Commerce 0.689 0.024 0.007 67 
Computer and related Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.694 0.194 0.000 11 
General Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.714 0.000 0.000 2 
General Machinery Manufacturing Industrials 0.715 0.034 0.018 56 
Coal Mining and Quarrying Public Utility 0.716 0.052 0.009 25 
Water Generation and Supply Public Utility 0.721 0.000 0.029 8 
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Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products Industrials 0.729 0.054 0.010 138 
Special Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.737 0.089 0.019 90 
Food and Beverage Commerce 0.737 0.000 0.000 3 
Tourism Commerce 0.744 0.070 0.023 20 
Beverages Industrials 0.750 0.006 0.021 27 
Wholesale of Energy,Material and Machine Electric 
Equipment 
Industrials 0.750 0.063 0.050 9 
Civil Engineering Construction Conglomerates 0.756 0.116 0.022 35 
Water Transportation Public Utility 0.767 0.129 0.065 11 
Rubber Manufacturing Industrials 0.773 0.068 0.000 10 
Other Transportation Public Utility 0.781 0.000 0.000 2 
Ferrous Metal Mining Industrials 0.786 0.000 0.000 1 
Trade Brokers and Agents Commerce 0.787 0.058 0.003 24 
Communications Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 0.805 0.000 0.049 6 
Wholesale of Food, Beverage, Tobacco and Home Products Commerce 0.806 0.083 0.000 6 
Air Transportation Public Utility 0.810 0.086 0.000 6 
Paper Manufacturing Industrials 0.833 0.000 0.083 1 
Electric Power,Steam and Hot Water Generation and Supply Industrials 0.839 0.161 0.007 59 
Public Facilities Services Public Utility 0.851 0.000 0.000 11 
Radio, Film and Television Conglomerates 0.854 0.000 0.000 6 
Warehousing Conglomerates 0.867 0.000 0.000 4 
Support Service for Transportation Public Utility 0.874 0.007 0.003 31 
Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding Industrials 0.876 0.110 0.011 34 
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Other Retail Commerce 0.895 0.632 0.000 2 
Other Processing Industrials 0.909 0.000 0.000 1 
Electric Power Generating Industrials 0.917 0.000 0.000 1 
Oil and Gas Extraction Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 3 
Iron Ore Mining Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Heavy Non-ferrous metal  Mining Industrials 1.000 0.571 0.000 1 
Alcohol and Alcohol Beverages Manufacturing Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Primary Chemical Materials Manufacturing Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Electronic Appliance  Manufacturing Industrials 1.000 0.214 0.000 1 
Electronic Component  Manufacturing Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Metallurgy, Mining, Machinery & Electric Industry Special 
Equipment Manufacturing 
Industrials 1.000 1.000 0.000 1 
Water Generation Public Utility 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Railroad Transportation Public Utility 1.000 0.739 0.000 3 
Coastal Transportation Public Utility 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Highway Supervision and Maintaining Public Utility 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Port Public Utility 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Computer related Equipment Manufacturing Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
Other ComputerApplication Service Conglomerates 1.000 0.333 0.000 1 
Wholesale of Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Parts and 
Supplies 
Industrials 1.000 0.000 0.267 1 
Integrated Secutities Firm Finance 1.000 0.000 0.000 2 
Other Public Facilities Services Public utility 1.000 0.129 0.065 2 
Advertising Services Commerce 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 
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Default prediction is critical to risk management and macro policies. Since the 
1960s, both accounting forecast models (e.g. Altman’s (1968) Z-score and 
Ohlson’s (1980) O-score) and market-based forecast models (e.g. the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing model (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1974)) have been developed for predicting corporate default. However, most 
existing studies only use U.S. data. As the world economy becomes more and 
more integrated, the factors that incorporate the interactions across different 
countries should also be taken into account. Currency exchange rate is just one 
of these factors, and its effect on firm default risk has not been investigated in 
academia.  The Credit Research Initiative database of the Risk Management 
Institute (RMI) of the National University of Singapore provides us with an 
international financial statement and market data (NUS-RMI, 2013). 
Therefore, in this paper, I can investigate the prediction power of currency 
return on firm default probability using the data for 30 countries.    
In recent years, as capital markets have become increasingly integrated, there 
has been a dramatic increase in the usage of foreign currency debt when firms 
make financing decisions. The foreign currency debt used in United States 
firms increased from around $1 billion in 1983 to $62 billion in 1998 (Kedia 
and Mozumdar, 2003). Moreover, non-U.S. firms raise a larger proportion of 
debt in foreign currency. Using the data for East Asian countries in 1997-
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1999, Allayannis, et al. (2003) find that foreign currency debt comprises about 
33.2% of firms’ total debt. In their entire sample of 327 firms, 61.8% use 
foreign debt in 1996 and the foreign debt usage rate reaches 100% for South 
Korea.   Possible explanations for issuing foreign currency debt are: hedging 
the currency exposure (Kedia and Mozumdar (2003), for the U.S. case; 
Keloharju and Niskanen (2001), for Finland; Aabo (2006), for Denmark); 
imports and exports (Keloharju and Niskanen (2001), for Finland; Gelos 
(2003), for Mexico); tax arbitrage, interest rate arbitrage, and so on. 
The wide usage of foreign currency debt provides us with a possible link 
between currency exchange rate and firms’ performance, liquidity and 
operations. Some previous theoretical models have suggested that foreign 
currency debt might be partly responsible for the Asian currency crisis around 
1997 (Chang and Velasco (1999), Krugman (1999)). Based on the model of 
Krugman (1999), foreign currency debt of any maturity should not be 
encouraged at any rate because borrowing in foreign currency could magnify 
the exchange rate impact. Therefore, through the channel of foreign currency 
debt, currency return could affect firms’ operations and could have prediction 
power on firm default events.  
When local currency depreciation exists, the sudden increase of foreign 
currency liabilities might take a firm into liquidity or operating difficulties. 
For example, the Strait Times reported in 1998 that “7 more 
Philippine firms seek government protection” and noted that “SEC officials 
said the firms traced their financial woes to the currency turmoil, which has 
seen the peso lose about 55 percent of its value against the US dollar since 
July…. According to the same sources, the falling peso has ballooned yearly 
61 
 
debt repayments of these firms, and swelled their total liabilities.”  This is not 
a special case, and we could expect that, through the channel of foreign 
currency debt, there is a positive association between currency exchange rate 
depreciation and firm default probability. 
I first test the prediction power of currency return on firm default probability. 
The default ratio of the entire sample during currency depreciation periods is 
0.53%, which is significantly higher than the default ratio (0.41%) during 
currency appreciation periods. When we control for several widely used 
default probability measures (Z-score, Distance-to-Default, Probability of 
Default of Duan, et al. (2012)), multivariate regression results still provide 
strong evidence that currency return is positively related to firm default 
probability. Currency return is defined as the return on the local currency 
exchange rate, which takes the form of Local Currency / U.S. Dollar. Positive 
currency return is associated with the depreciation of local currency. 
Moreover, I examine the effects of local currency depreciation and 
appreciation separately. Through the channel of corporate foreign currency 
debt, large currency depreciation should be the major factor to affect default 
risk. I find that when the local currency depreciates by more than 55%, the 
default ratio increases to 3.6%, while the default ratio for the entire sample is 
only about 0.6%. Our multivariate regression results also suggest that large 
currency depreciation (larger than 10% for the last 12 months) could increase 
the firm’s default probability significantly, while the effect of currency 
appreciation is not significant.  
62 
 
Since firm-level foreign currency debt data are very difficult to obtain, I use 
country-level international trade data as proxy for the likelihood of using 
foreign currency debt. If a country’s economy more relies on exports and 
imports, the firms in this country are more likely to issue foreign currency 
debt. I find empirical evidence that the effect of currency return on firm 
default risk is more significant for countries that more rely on international 
trade. This is supporting evidence for the channel of foreign currency debt. 
There is a popular argument that local currency depreciation is good for 
exports while appreciation is good for imports. However, due to foreign 
currency debt, large currency depreciation will increase firms’ liabilities and 
lead to higher default risk, and this effect does not depend on the exports or 
imports business. If the two arguments both work, it is possible that, large 
currency depreciation could lead to higher default risk, but small depreciation 
will be good for the exports business. I use the subsample of small 
depreciation (currency return is in the normal range (-20%, 20%)), and find 
evidence that the exchange rate changes have different effects on the exports 
business and imports business. The small local currency depreciation leads to 
lower firm default risk for countries in trade surplus (exports are larger than 
the imports), and small local currency appreciation could reduce the default 
risk for countries in trade deficit. 
Furthermore, I examine the effect of currency return interacting with the 
country’s exchange rate policy. I find that the currency depreciation has less 
effect on default risk for countries with restrictions on the exchange rate. And 
the moderating effect of an exchange rate control policy mainly works for 
currency returns in the normal range. That is, when there are large currency 
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depreciations, the exchange rate control policy could not moderate the effect 
of the depreciation on a firm’s default risk.  
In addition, I also investigate the effect of currency return interacting with a 
country’s financial market development. Firms in countries with better 
financial market development might have more access to exchange rate 
hedging instruments and might have more financing channels when facing 
currency depreciation. I find supporting evidence that currency depreciation 
has fewer effects on firm default risk for countries with better financial market 
development.  
This paper makes several contributions to firm default forecast models. First 
of all, I find strong evidence for the prediction power of currency return. 
Sudden large currency depreciation could directly affect firms’ operations, and 
lead to default in the worst case. This provides some implications for 
government monetary and fiscal policy when facing currency depreciations. 
Secondly, using the data from 30 economies, this study tests some widely used 
default probability measures, and provides some insights on default 
forecasting for non-U.S. companies, especially for developing countries. As 
the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, factors, such as currency 
return, which capture the interactions across different countries, should be paid 
more attention when developing credit risk models. Moreover, this paper 
examines the effects of macro-level factors on the micro-level firm default 
risk, and could provide some policy implications on the exchange rate and 
financial market development.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data and the main variables. The summary statistics for the main variables are 
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presented in Section 3. Section 4 performs and discusses empirical analyses. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.2. Data and Main Variables 
I employ the Credit Research Initiative database of the Risk Management 
Institute (RMI) of the National University of Singapore, which provides 
comprehensive information on both market and financial statement data on 
about 60,000 exchange-listed firms of 106 economies around the world. I 
retrieved the data used in this paper from the RMI database in January 2012. 
The sample includes 30 economies from Asia, Europe and America whose 
data were available on the RMI database in January 2012: Australia, China, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, United States, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  The time period 
in our sample is from 1990 to 2011. The starting time for different economies 
in the sample is different. The final sample includes around 410,000 firm-year 
observations for the main regression analysis. 
a. Currency return 




teExchangeRateExchangeRatCrncy 1Re   
The base currency for the exchange rate is the U.S. dollar. The exchange rate 
is presented as local currency per U.S. dollar. Thus, for a country, a positive 
currency return is associated with the local currency depreciation. I also 
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construct several indicators: Large Positive Return, an indicator for the large 
depreciation of local currency (the currency return is larger than 10%); Large 
Negative Return, an indicator for the large appreciation of local currency (the 
currency return is less than -10%); Normal Range Return, an indicator for 
currency returns in (-20%, 20%). 
b. Default events 
The dependent variable in the main regressions is Default, a dummy variable 
indicating the happening of default events. The default events are extracted 
from the RMI database. These events are collected from many resources, 
including Bloomberg, Wind Financial database, Compustat, The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Moody’s reports, Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ), exchange web sites and news sources. A challenging problem is 
that the definition of default might vary across different data sources. RMI 
applies a default definition consistently across different economies. Based on 
the RMI technical report (2013), the default events can be classified under one 
of the following events: 
1. Legal impasse to the timely settlement of interest or principal 
payments, such as bankruptcy filing, receivership, administration, 
liquidation;  
2. Missed or delayed payments of interest or principal, not including 
delayed payments made within a grace period; 
3. Debt restructuring or distressed exchange, in which a new security 
or package of securities is offered to debt holders, resulting in a 
diminished financial obligation (such as a conversion of debt to 
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equity, debt with lower coupon or par value, debt with lower 
seniority, debt with longer maturity). 
Moreover, the definition also incorporates some default actions that are 
specific to some economies, such as Declared Sick (for India only), 
Rehabilitation (Thailand) and so on.  
c.  Measures of Default Probability 
The main control variables used in our analysis are several popular default risk 
measures from previous default risk models: 
Probability of Default (PD): Duan, et al. (2012) propose a forward intensity 
approach for the prediction of corporate defaults over different future periods. 
And the prediction is very accurate for short periods, with the accuracy ratios 
exceeding 90% for 1- and 3-month horizons and 80% for 6- and 12-month 
horizons using U.S. data. The accuracy ratio decreases when the horizon is 
increased to two or three years, but its performance remains reasonable. This 
measure incorporates the profit, liquidity and market information of the firm. 
The data are available on the RMI database. The PD for a 1-year horizon is 
used in this paper. 
Distance-to-Default (DTD): Based on Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default 
model, distance-to-default measures the distance between the current value of 













where Vt denotes the current value of assets, L denotes the liabilities, and  
 
is the asset volatility. These data are available in the RMI database. Duan and 
Wang (2012) discuss the estimation methods for DTD calculation. For 
financial and properties firms, which typically have higher leverage, the KMV 
Corporation’s estimation seems ill-suited. Thus, a transformed-data maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) approach is applied to the DTD calculation in the 
RMI database. 
Z-Score: Altman’s Z-Score is calculated by the following equation: 








where ߚ௝are the discriminant coefficients and ௝ܺ௧  are discriminant variables. 
Altman’s variables include five accounting ratios: working capital to total 
assets (WC/TA), retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/TA), market equity to total liabilities 
(ME/TL), and sales to total assets (SL/TA). In calculating Altman’s Z-score 
for a developing country, the variable SL/TA, is not used.  
 
2.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables for the analysis. 
The mean of currency return is -0. 2%, which is very close to 0, and the 
median value is 0. 9.6% of total observations having currency returns larger 
than 10%, with 12.7% having currency returns of less than -10%. 92% of the 
currency returns are in the normal range (-20%, 20%).  This table also presents 




are in countries with restrictions on the exchange rate. The countries, whose 
international trade (sum of exports and imports, % of gross domestic product 
(GDP)) is larger than the median value of the 30 economies, account for 22.9% 
of the sample observations. 52% of total observations are in countries with a 
trade surplus (the exports are greater than the imports by at least 3% of GDP).     
 [Insert Table 2.1 Here] 
From Table 2.1, the default ratio for the whole sample is 0.60%. The default 
ratio of some subsamples under different exchange rate changing scenarios are 
reported in Figure 2.1, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, which also provide us with the 
univariate test results for currency return and default risk. The default ratio for 
the currency depreciation sample is 0.53%, which is significantly larger than 
the ratio for the non-depreciation sample (0.46%). When the local currency 
depreciates for more than 10%, the default ratio will increase to 0.61%. Thus, 
the comparisons suggest that higher currency return is associated with a higher 
default ratio.  
 [Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
Table 2.3 provides default ratio comparisons for each economy. For most of 
the economies in our sample, the default ratio during currency depreciation 
periods is larger, compared to the ratio during non-depreciation periods. For 
China (2.45% vs. 1.85%), Indonesia (1.54% vs. 0.38%), South Korea (1.07% 
vs. 0.20%) and Thailand (2.47% vs. 0.63%), the difference between two ratios 
is much more significant. Firms in developing countries might not have good 
hedging ability and are more likely to be affected by the exchange rate 
depreciation. Moreover, countries like South Korea (Allayannis, et al., 2003), 
which have a high usage rate of foreign currency debt, are affected more by 
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the currency depreciation. Although the difference between the two ratios is 
also significant for Euro Zone countries (0.58% vs. 0.30%) and the United 
Kingdom (0.32% vs. 0.10%), East Asian countries are more likely to be 
affected by exchange rate depreciation. 
 [Insert Table 2.3 Here] 
In Figure 2.1, I divide the entire sample into ten subsamples based on the 
currency return. Then for each subsample, I obtain the default ratio, which is 
calculated as the number of default events divided by the total firm-year 
observations in the subsample. When the local currency depreciates by more 
than 60%, the default ratio reaches 3.6%, which is six times more than the 
default ratio when the exchange rate does not change. The default ratio is 
nearly 2.4% when the currency depreciates by 50%. Thus, we could expect 
that the large currency depreciation is associated with higher firm default 
probability. For the case of local currency appreciation (negative currency 
return), the default ratio increases as the currency appreciation increases, but 
the change of default ratio seems insignificant.  
 [Insert Figure 2.1 Here] 
 
2.4. Empirical Models and Results 
First, I examine the prediction power of currency returns and large positive 
currency returns on firm default events. I use the country-level international 
trade data to proxy for the likelihood of using foreign currency debt, and then I 
test the channel that drives the association between currency return and default 
risk. Moreover, I examine the asymmetric effects of currency return on default 
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risk when the countries are in trade surplus or trade deficit. I also test the 
effect of currency return interacting with the country’s exchange rate policy 
and interacting with the country’s financial market development.  
2.4.1. The prediction power of currency returns on firm default 
events 
Using probit regressions, I test the prediction power of currency return on a 
corporate default event.  I employ the following yearly regression model:  
000 Re   iablesControlVartCurrencyDefault  
The regression results are reported in Table 2.4. I include different control 
variables in five columns. The coefficients on Currency Return are positive 
and significant at the 1% level in all five regressions, providing strong 
evidence for the prediction power of currency return. The positive coefficients 
suggest that local currency depreciation could increase the firm default 
probability. In column (1), the coefficient on Currency Return is 0.409 and z-
statistics is 7.71. In column (2), I include the default probability measure (PD) 
of Duan, et al. (2012). This measure incorporates financial and market 
information and has a high default forecasting accuracy. The coefficient on 
Currency Return is positive and significant. In addition, I also include other 
control variables in columns (3)-(5): accounting-based default risk measure Z-
Score, market data-based default risk measure DTD, firm size, country stock 
market return, global industry return and the global market return.  As 
expected, the coefficient on PD is positive and significant and the coefficient 
on DTD is negative. After controlling for PD, the Z-Score is not significant, 
probably because the financial statement information has been incorporated in 
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PD. For all regressions, I include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects. Since the Currency Return is a macro variable and the 
dependent variable is firm-specific, standard errors in all the regressions in my 
analysis are clustered by firm. From column (5), the coefficients on firm size, 
industry return, and global market return are not significant after controlling 
for the traditional default risk measures, and thus I take column (2) as the base 
regression for the following analysis. Overall, after controlling for firm-
specific accounting information, market information and the industry 
information, we still can observe the prediction power of currency return on 
firm default probability. The currency return could be taken into account when 
developing new default forecasting models. 
 [Insert Table 2.4 Here] 
Previous summary statistics (Figure 2.1) for the default ratio suggest that large 
currency depreciation (large positive currency return) mainly drives the 
positive association between currency return and firm default risk. As 
discussed in Section 2.1, through the channel of corporate foreign currency 
debt, large currency depreciation could lead to a jump in firms’ liabilities and 
increase the default risk significantly. I conduct probit regressions to examine 
the prediction power of large currency depreciation and appreciation on firm 
default events separately using two dummy variables, Large Positive Currency 
Return and Large Negative Currency Return. Large Positive Currency Return 
equals 1 if the local currency depreciates by more than 10%. A similar 
definition is applied to Large Negative Currency Return. Table 2.5 reports the 
regression results. The coefficients on Large Positive Currency Return both 
are positive and significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (2), suggesting 
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that large currency depreciation could lead to higher firm default probability. 
This is consistent with our discussion about corporate foreign currency debt, 
which connects the currency exchange rate and firms’ operations. In column 
(2), I include the variable Large Negative Currency Return and do not find a 
significant coefficient, suggesting that large currency appreciation might not 
affect the default probability significantly. The regression results provide 
evidence that currency depreciation is the major reason for the default risk, 
and the results are consistent with the summary statistics for default ratio 
presented in Figure 2.1.  
 [Insert Table 2.5 Here] 
2.4.2. The effect of currency return and a country’s international 
trade 
I argue that corporate foreign currency debt is the channel that accounts for the 
positive association between currency depreciation and default risk. 
Unfortunately, firm-level foreign currency debt data are very difficult to 
obtain. Many previous studies use surveys to collect relevant data and the data 
quality might not be guaranteed. In this paper, I use country-level international 
trade data as proxy for the likelihood of using foreign currency debt. Firms in 
countries whose economy more relies on international trade are more likely to 
use foreign currency debt, and thus are more likely to be affected by the 
exchange rate change. Therefore, it could be expected that the effect of 
currency return is more significant for countries that more rely on international 
trade.  
Table 2.6 reports the regression results. I include the interaction term 
Currency Return * Trade to examine the effect of international trade. Trade is 
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a dummy variable equal to 1 if the sum of the country’s exports (% of GDP) 
and imports (% of GDP) is greater than the median value of the 30 economies 
in the sample. If Trade is able to capture the likelihood of using foreign 
currency debt, the coefficient on the interaction term is expected to be 
positive. In column (1), the coefficient on Currency Return * Trade is 0.206 
and significant (z-statistics = 1.90), suggesting that the currency return has 
more effects on firm default risk for countries that more rely on international 
trade. I divide the entire sample into two subsamples based on Trade. In 
column (2), using the observations of countries that heavily depend on 
international trade, I find the positive and significant coefficient on Currency 
Return (0.299, z = 4.07). But in column (3), using the observations of 
countries that less rely on international trade, the coefficient on Currency 
Return becomes insignificant. Since the international trade data could be taken 
as proxy for the likelihood of using foreign currency debt, the regression 
results provide evidence that foreign currency debt is the channel that connects 
the currency return and firm default risk. This is consistent with the previous 
discussions.  
 [Insert Table 2.6 Here] 
2.4.3. The asymmetric effects of currency return  
It is widely accepted that currency depreciation is good for companies doing 
export business and currency appreciation is good for imports. Thus, it is 
possible that the currency return has the opposite effect on firms doing export 
business and firms doing import business. However, as discussed in previous 
sections, through the channel of foreign currency debt, currency depreciation, 
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especially large currency depreciation, could lead to a large increase in firm 
liabilities and lead to significantly higher default risk. If both arguments work 
for the effect of currency return, it is possible that, large currency depreciation 
will lead to higher default risk due to the foreign currency debt, but small 
depreciations might be good for firms doing export business. 
Again unfortunately, company-level export and import data are very private 
and very difficult to find. In this paper, I use country-level data to empirically 
test the asymmetric effects of currency return for firms doing business in 
exports or imports. Trade surplus is defined as when a country’s exports are 
larger than its imports by at least 3% of the total GDP. The regression results 
are presented in Table 2.7. I construct a subsample that only includes the 
observations with currency returns in the normal range (-20%, 20%). The 
subsample is used for Table 2.7. That is, the effect of a small currency return 
is examined. In column (1), the coefficient on Currency Return is negative and 
significant (-0.603, z-statistics = -2.17), suggesting that when the currency 
return is in the normal range, currency depreciation leads to lower default risk 
for countries in trade surplus. This provides evidence that small currency 
depreciation is good for exports. However, in column (2), the coefficient on 
Currency Return is positive and significant (0.666, z = 2.16), suggesting that 
small currency appreciation is good for countries in trade deficit. Combining 
the two regressions, the table provides evidence that when the exchange rate 
change is in the normal range, currency depreciation is good for exports and 
appreciation is good for imports. 
 [Insert Table 2.7 Here] 
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2.4.4. The effect of currency return and a country’s exchange rate 
policy 
Some countries place restrictions on the exchange rate change and might 
enforce an exchange rate control policy. Under this policy, the changes in the 
exchange rate are smoothed and the volatility of currency returns is smaller. 
Thus, the currency return might have less effect on default risk for countries 
with an exchange rate control policy. The empirical results are reported in 
Table 2.8. 
The country’s exchange rate arrangement classification is based on Ilzetzki, et 
al. (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The country is classified as an 
exchange rate control country if the exchange rate arrangements occur with: 1) 
no separate legal tender; 2) pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement; 
3) pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 4) 
de facto peg; 5) pre-announced crawling peg; 6) pre-announced crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 7) de facto crawling peg; or 8) de 
facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. I include the 
interaction term Currency Return*ExchgControl in regressions and 
ExchgControl is an indicator for an exchange rate control policy. Using the 
entire sample, the coefficient on Currency Return*ExchgControl is -0.608 and 
significant at the 1% level in column (1), suggesting that currency depreciation 
has less effect on default risk for countries with an exchange rate control 
policy. Furthermore, I examine under what scenarios the exchange rate policy 
could moderate the effect of currency return on default risk. I conduct the 
same regressions in two subsamples based on the currency return. In column 
(2), using observations with currency returns in the normal range, the 
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coefficient on Currency Return*ExchgControl is still negative and significant. 
However, when I use observations with large currency returns in column (3), 
the coefficient on the interaction term becomes insignificant. Combining the 
findings in columns (2) and (3), it seems that the exchange rate policy only has 
a significant moderate effect when the exchange rate changes are in the normal 
range. When there are large currency depreciations or appreciations, the 
exchange rate control policy does not work.  
 [Insert Table 2.8 Here] 
2.4.5. The effect of currency return and financial market 
development 
For firms in countries with a high level of financial market development, there 
might be more hedging instruments for the exchange rate risk, as well as more 
financing channels when facing large currency depreciation. Thus, the effect 
of currency return on firm default risk should be less for countries with a 
higher level of financial market development. Cihak, et al. (2012) construct 
country-level indexes for financial system development. The index includes 
indicators for the depth of financial institutions, depth of financial market, 
efficiency of financial institutions and financial market, stability of financial 
institutions and financial market, and so on. The data are available on the 
World Bank Global Financial Development Database. Table 2.9 reports the 
regression results. I include the five interaction terms of currency return and 
financial market development indicators: Currency Return*FinInstDepth, 
Currency Return*FinMktDepth, Currency Return*FinInstEfficiency, 
CurrencyReturn*FinMktEfficiency, Currency Return*FinInstStability. The 
coefficients on these interaction terms are all negative and significant, 
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suggesting that currency depreciation has a less significant effect on firm 
default risk for countries with larger depth of financial institutions and 
financial market, higher efficiency of financial institutions and financial 
market, and more stable financial institutions. In general, the results provide 
strong evidence that firm default risk is less affected by exchange rate changes 
for countries with better financial market development. 
 [Insert Table 2.9 Here] 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
In this paper, I find strong evidence for the prediction power of currency 
return on firm default risk. I investigate currency depreciation and 
appreciation separately, and find that large local currency deprecation is a 
major reason for the positive association between currency return and default 
risk. Since firm-level foreign currency debt data are very difficult to obtain, I 
use country-level international trade data (the sum of exports and imports) as 
proxy for the likelihood of using foreign currency debt.  I find that the 
currency return has more effects for countries that more rely on internal trade, 
providing supporting evidence for the channel of foreign currency debt that 
connects the exchange rate and firm default risk. Moreover, I find that while 
large currency depreciation could lead to higher default risk, small 
depreciation is good for countries with trade surplus (exports are larger than 
imports) and small appreciation is good for countries with a trade deficit. 
During the small exchange rate changing period, the currency return has 
different effects for the exports business and imports business. In addition, the 
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effect of currency return is less significant for countries with restrictions on 
the exchange rate and for countries with better financial market development. 
Overall, factors such as currency return, which incorporate the interactions 
across different countries, should be taken into account when developing new 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definition 
Variable Name Definition 
  
Currency Return  






teExchangeRateExchangeRatCrncy 1Re   
 The base currency for exchange rate is US dollar. The 
exchange rate is in the form of Local Currency /US dollar.  
Therefore, the positive currency return means the depreciation 
of local currency, and the negative currency return means the 
appreciation of local currency. 
 
Large Positive Return A dummy variable equals 1 when the currency return is 
greater than 10%. This is an indicator of large depreciation of 
the local currency.  
  
Large Negative Return A dummy variable equals 1 when the currency return is 
smaller than  
-10%. This is an indicator of large appreciation of the local 
currency. 
  
Normal Range The currency return is in (-20%, 20%). 
  
  
Default Events  
  
Default Indicator of default events happening at year t. The default 
events are extracted from the RMI database. These events are 
collected from many resources, including Bloomberg, Wind 
Financial Database, Compustat, CRSP, Moody’s reports, TEJ, 
exchange web sites and news sources. The default events can 
be classified under one of the following events: 1, Legal 
impasse to the timely settlement of interest or principal 
payments, such as bankruptcy filing, receivership, 
administration, liquidation; 2, Missed or delayed payments of 
interest or principal, not including delayed payments made 
within a grace period; 3, Debt restructuring or distressed 
exchange, in which a new security or package of securities is 
offered to debt holders, resulting in a diminished financial 
obligation (such as a conversion of debt to equity, debt with 
lower coupon or par value, debt with lower seniority, debt 
with longer maturity). 
 
  
Measures of Firm 
Default Probability 
 
PD Probability of Default in next 12 months. Duan, Sun and 
Wang (2012) proposed a forward intensity approach for the 
prediction of corporate defaults over different future periods. 
And the prediction is very accurate for short periods, with the 
accuracy ratios exceeding 90% for 1 and 3-month horizons 
and 80% for 6 and 12-month horizons. The accuracy 
deteriorates somewhat when the horizon is increased to two or 
three years, but its performance still remains reasonable. The 
data is available in the RMI database. The data from RMI 
database in this paper is retrieved in January of 2012. 
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DTD Distance to Default. Based on Merton Distance to Default 
model, distance-to-default measures the distance between the 
current value of assets and the debt amount in terms of asset 
volatility. This data is available in the RMI database. 
Z-score Altman Z-score is calculated by the following equation: 









where ߚ௝are the discriminant coefficients and ௝ܺ௧ are 
discriminant variables. Original Altman’s variables include 
five accounting ratios: working capital to total assets 
(WC/TA), retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/TA), market 
equity to total liabilities (ME/TL), and sales to total assets 
(SL/TA). In calculating Altman’s Z-score for developing 










Trade Equals 1 if the sum of exports (good and service, % of the 
GDP) and imports (good and service, % of the GDP) for the 
country is larger than the median of all the 30 economies at 
year t. The exports and imports data is available on World 
Bank Data.  
  
Trade Surplus Equals 1 if the country is in trade surplus and equals 0 if the 
country is in trade deficit. The trade surplus means that 
exports is larger than imports by at least 3% of the total GDP. 
The threshold value for trade deficit is also 3% of the GDP.   
  
ExchgControl Equals 1 if the country is classified as a country with 
exchange rate control policy. Exchange rate control policy 
refers to the exchange rate arrangements with: 1) no separate 
legal tender; 2) pre announced peg or currency board 
arrangement; 3) pre announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 4) de facto peg; 5) pre 
announced crawling peg; 6) pre announced crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 7) de facto crawling peg; 
or 8) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2%. The classification of exchange rate arrangements is 
based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004). The data is available on Carmen 
Reinhart’s website. In their classification, Euro Zone countries 
cannot decide the policy of Euros individually, and are 
classified into category 1). Since Euro is the currency used for 
Euro Zone countries in the sample, I do not classify these 
countries as exchange rate control country. Finally, the 
exchange rate control economies are: China, Hong Kong, 




FinInstDepth The country-level index for depth of the financial institutions. 
Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012) construct 
country-level indexes for financial system development. One 
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of the indicators is the depth of financial institutions. The data 
is available on World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database. 
  
FinMktDepth The country-level index for depth of the financial market. 
  
FinInstEfficiency The country-level index for efficiency of the financial 
institutions.  
  
FinMktEfficiency The country-level index for efficiency of the financial market.  
  
FinInstStability The country-level index for stability of the financial 
institutions. 
  
Euro Zone countries Include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 






Size Calculated as log(1+Total Assets). 
  
Market Return Stock market return in past 12 months for each economy.  
  
Industry Return Value weighted industry stock return. The value weighted 
average of the stock returns of all firms from 30 economies in 
the same industry. The stock price and market capitalization 
have been changed to US dollar before return calculation. The 
industry is defined based on GICS sectors.  
  
Global Return Value weighted global stock return. The value weighted 
average of the stock returns of all firms from 30 economies in 
the sample. The stock price and market capitalization have 

















Figure 1 Default ratio and currency return 
 
This figure reports firm default ratio under different ranges of currency returns. The default  





























Table 2.1 Summary Statistics  
  









Currency Return  414,514 -0.002 0.106 -0.052 0.000 0.007 
Large Positive Currency Return 429,401 0.096 0.294 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Large Negative Currency Return 429,401 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Normal Range Currency Return 429,401 0.920 0.271 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Default 429,401 0.006 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PD 429,401 0.007 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.005 
Country Characteristics 
ExchgControl 429,401 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade 413,862 0.229 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade Surplus 177,286 0.518 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FinInstDepth 379,549 91.301 44.185 51.341 92.793 113.138 
FinMktDepth 387,057 105.598 71.567 64.611 94.748 129.954 
FinInstEfficiency 383,816 1.644 1.150 0.873 1.437 2.721 
FinMktEfficiency 387,057 111.710 75.507 58.173 94.084 142.482 




Table 2.2  Default Ratio Distribution 
 
This table reports firm default ratio under different exchange rate changing scenarios. The default ratio is calculated as the number of the default events divided by total 













  Depreciation Non-depreciation Appreciation Large Depreciation (>10%) 
Number of Defaults 654 1417 784 251 
Default Ratio 0.53% 0.46% 0.41% 0.61% 
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Table 2.3 Default ratio summary for each economy (United States excluded) 
This table reports firm default ratio for each economy under different exchange rate changing scenarios. The default ratio is calculated as the number of the default  
events divided by total firm-year observations.  


















Australia 6727 15050 59 48 0.88% 0.32% 
China 4204 14190 103 263 2.45% 1.85% 
Hong Kong 9244 6141 24 22 0.26% 0.36% 
India 13876 12659 19 15 0.14% 0.12% 
Indonesia 2596 1588 40 6 1.54% 0.38% 
Japan 24358 34373 46 111 0.19% 0.32% 
Malaysia 4539 9411 36 47 0.79% 0.50% 
Philippines 1356 1407 12 10 0.88% 0.71% 
Singapore 2497 6056 15 17 0.60% 0.28% 
South Korea 6066 13566 65 27 1.07% 0.20% 
Taiwan 7566 7905 12 13 0.16% 0.16% 
Thailand 2182 4423 54 28 2.47% 0.63% 
Canada 6825 7003 36 31 0.53% 0.44% 
Euro Zone 11427 35952 66 107 0.58% 0.30% 
Denmark 1632 1801 8 5 0.49% 0.28% 



















Norway 1429 1966 6 7 0.42% 0.36% 
Sweden 2283 3708 9 16 0.39% 0.43% 
Switzerland 1737 2408 1 3 0.06% 0.12% 
United 
Kingdom 
13454 16590 43 16 0.32% 0.10% 
Mean Ratio     0.71% 0.47% 
Total 
Observations 
124179 196388 654 795   
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Table 2.4 The prediction power of currency return on firm default event 
This table reports the prediction power of currency return on corporate default event.  The 
dependent variable Default is a dummy variable indicating the corporate default event in year 
t+1. The main independent variable is the currency return in year t. All regressions include 
constant terms, country fixed effect, industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. The industry 
is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 3. 
The sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard errors are corrected for 
within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%level 
respectively. The table also reports z-statistics in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Default Default Default Default Default 
      
Currency Return 0.409*** 0.306*** 0.906*** 0.736*** 0.862*** 
 (7.71) (5.43) (5.53) (4.15) (4.75) 
PD  6.889*** 8.566*** 5.598*** 5.579*** 
  (31.60) (17.00) (11.94) (11.77) 
Z-score   -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.75) (-0.08) (0.15) 
DTD    -0.159*** -0.163*** 
    (-14.63) (-14.44) 
Market Return     0.162*** 
     (2.84) 
Size     0.004 
     (0.47) 
Industry Return     0.009 
     (0.42) 
Global Return     0.050 
     (0.95) 
      
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 410,508 410,508 175,813 158,824 156,155 













Table 2.5 The prediction power of large currency depreciation on 
corporate default event 
This table reports the prediction power of large currency depreciation on corporate default 
event.  The dependent variable Default is a dummy variable indicating the corporate default 
event in year t+1. The main independent variable is the currency return in year t. All 
regressions include constant terms, country fixed effect, industry fixed effect and year fixed 
effects. The industry is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable definitions are 
stated in the Appendix 3. The sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard 
errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z-statistics in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Default Default 
   
Large Positive Currency Return 0.108*** 0.105*** 
 (3.73) (3.51) 
Large Negative Currency Return  -0.012 
  (-0.36) 
PD 6.915*** 6.916*** 
 (31.63) (31.63) 
   
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 423,843 423,843 


















Table 2.6 The effect of currency return and the international trade 
This table reports the effect of currency return on default risk when firms are in countries 
which more relies on international trade. The dependent variable Default is a dummy variable 
indicating the corporate default event in year t+1. The main independent variable is the 
currency return in year t. Trade is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the sum of the 
country’s Exports (% of GDP) and Imports (% of GDP) is greater than the median value of the 
30 economies in the sample. All regressions include constant terms, industry fixed effect and 
year fixed effects. The industry is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable 
definitions are stated in the Appendix 3. The sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. 
The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z-statistics in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) 




    
Currency Return 0.113 0.299*** 0.156 
 (1.15) (4.07) (1.53) 
Currency Return*Trade 0.206*   
 (1.90)   
Trade -0.037*   
 (-1.92)   
PD 7.417*** 8.055*** 7.343*** 
 (32.16) (9.98) (30.44) 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 398,690 89,573 306,314 
















Table 2.7 The different effects of currency return when countries are in 
trade surplus or deficit 
This table reports the different effects of currency return when countries are in trade surplus or 
trade deficit. The dependent variable Default is a dummy variable indicating the corporate 
default event in year t+1. The main independent variable is the currency return in year t. The 
sample used in this table only includes observations with currency returns in normal range (-
20%, 20%). All regressions include constant terms, industry fixed effect and year fixed 
effects. The industry is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable definitions are 
stated in the Appendix 3. The sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard 
errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z-statistics in brackets. 





   
Currency Return -0.603** 0.666** 
 (-2.17) (2.16) 
PD 8.894*** 6.058*** 
 (13.99) (20.46) 
   
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
   





















Table 2.8 The effect of currency return and country exchange rate policy 
This table reports the effect of currency return when firms are in countries with exchange rate 
control policy. The dependent variable Default is a dummy variable indicating the corporate 
default event in year t+1. The main independent variable is the currency return in year t. 
ExchgControl is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the country has restrictions on 
exchange rate. The exchange rate arrangements classification is based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The column (2) uses the normal range 
sample including observations with currency returns in normal range. And the column (3) uses 
the non-normal range sample including observations with large currency depreciation or 
appreciation. All regressions include constant terms, industry fixed effect and year fixed 
effects. The industry is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable definitions are 
stated in the Appendix 3. The sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard 
errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%level respectively. The table also reports z-statistics in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    
Currency Return 0.295*** 0.932*** 0.381*** 
 (5.30) (3.69) (5.43) 
Currency Return*ExchgControl -0.608*** -1.282*** 0.223 
 (-3.69) (-3.37) (0.78) 
ExchgControl 0.228*** 0.251*** -0.092 
 (9.85) (9.88) (-1.19) 
PD 7.428*** 7.261*** 8.571*** 
 (32.39) (31.05) (8.87) 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 414,115 333,471 71,472 










Table 2.9 The effect of currency return and financial market development 
This table reports the effect of currency return on firm default risk under different financial market development environments. The dependent variable Default is a dummy 
variable indicating the corporate default event in year t+1. The main independent variable is the currency return in year t. The indicators for financial market development 
FinInstDepth, FinMktDepth, FinInstEffiency, FinMktEfficiency, FinInstStability are from World Bank Global Financial Development Database.  All regressions include 
constant terms, industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. The industry is defined based on GICS sectors. Details of variable definitions are stated in the Appendix 3. The 
sample period in this table is from 1990 to 2011. The standard errors are corrected for within-firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Default Default Default Default Default 
      
Currency Return 0.408*** 0.293*** 0.183** 0.357*** 0.347*** 
 (4.38) (3.90) (2.56) (4.83) (6.18) 
Currency Return*FinInstDepth -0.002**     
 (-2.06)     
FinInstDepth -0.000     
 (-1.46)     
Currency Return*FinMktDepth  -0.002*    
  (-1.75)    
FinMktDepth  -0.001***    
  (-5.59)    
Currency Return*FinInstEffiency   -0.035***   
   (-3.10)   
FinInstEffiency   0.029***   
   (3.80)   
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Currency Return*FinMktEfficiency    -0.002*  
    (-1.91)  
FinMktEfficiency    0.000***  
    (2.82)  
Currency Return*FinInstStability     -0.012** 
     (-2.56) 
FinInstStability     0.000 
     (0.45) 
PD 7.413*** 7.417*** 7.348*** 7.360*** 7.368*** 
 (31.31) (31.92) (31.56) (31.49) (31.03) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 367,627 371,885 368,222 371,885 316,850 
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.141 0.140 0.140 0.133 
 
 
 
 
